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Chapter
11: Reflecting on the Past/Looking to the Future
I
have been very fortunate in being able to combine my military
experience with my service in Congress to help develop a
more effective fighting force for our country. Over the
years in which I have observed U.S. forces deployed in combat
and in peacekeeping missions, I have learned many lessons.
So have our government and our military. However, although
there have been some stunning successes, often administrations
have tended to underestimate or misinterpret these lessons
when they formulated and executed policy.
The Importance of Intelligence
When I was an intelligence officer in Vietnam, Marine Gunnery
Sergeant Wolf gave me a plaque bearing the words "Victory
is knowing your enemy." I cannot stress enough the
importance of those words. The United States’ intelligence
arsenal is vast. Its satellites provide photographic, signal,
voice, weather, and location information to our forces;
intelligence aircraft provide photo surveillance, electronic
surveillance, and signals intelligence; specialists in almost
any country you can name analyze the data; HUMINT and other
programs supplement these efforts. In addition, tactical
military intelligence systems provide massive amounts of
information on the locations of enemy troop concentrations
and their communications. The United States' civilian and
military intelligence infrastructure dwarfs that of any
other country in the world.
In
all the crises I have witnessed, the common thread has been
the importance of intelligence. The intelligence challenges
have ranged from the macro to the micro. In Vietnam, would
China intervene if the bombing of North Vietnam was escalated?
Where were the Viet Cong's tunnels? In Lebanon, which of
the intelligence reports of a threatened terrorist attack
against our troops was credible? In Panama, where had General
Noriega gone in the aftermath of our intervention? In the
Persian Gulf, how effective would the Iraqi forces be? In
Somalia, where was Aideed? In Afghanistan, where was Osama
bin Laden? What is the status of Iraq's effort to build
weapons of mass destruction?
Robert
M. Gates, then director of the CIA, stated in December 1992:
In
reality it is the daily collection and analysis of millions
of bits of
information that consume nearly all of our resources and
fuel the
decision-making process. Who is killing whom in Bosnia?
How long
are the runways in Somalia? Where are the 30,000 nuclear
warheads
in Russia and who controls them? How far along is Libya's
chemical
weapons plant? To whom is North Korea selling its missiles?
. . .
What are the frequencies of Iranian radars? These and
thousands of
other questions pour in to us twenty-four hours a day
from policy
makers, the military, and the Congress-all three with
insatiable appetites
for information.
I
have been greatly concerned about the deployment of American
forces to countries that are so peripheral to our national
interests that we have very little intelligence about them.
Vernon Loeb wrote in the Washington Post about the CIA contingent
in Somalia. Garret Jones, "a former Miami
police detective, . . . had just finished a year's study
at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., where he'd written
a paper on UN peacekeeping missions' need for a dedicated
structure for analyzing intelligence. Three other temporary
station chiefs had already rotated in and out of Somalia,
and Jones was the only candidate left back at Langley who
wanted to go and knew anything about Africa." Jones's
aide in Mogadishu, John Spinelli, had arrived just a week
before Jones, having been torn from a plum assignment in
the CIA's Rome station. He knew nothing about Africa, but
he spoke Italian, and the Italians in the UN peacekeeping
force weren't getting along with their American counterparts.
When Spinelli took Jones to the CIA station, the new chief's
jaw dropped: It consisted of two windblown rooms in the
vandalized former residence of the U.S. ambassador. Only
one room had a door. Spinelli told him they had no business
being in the middle of this war zone, trying to meet secretly
with agents in a city where they couldn't drive down the
street without getting shot at.
Over
the decades the capabilities and effectiveness of our national
intelligence programs have fluctuated. Accurate and timely
intelligence is the ultimate force multiplier—that
is, the key to using our military effectively. A robust
and effective intelligence capability is absolutely central
to our national security posture.
In
1993 I offered an amendment to the defense appropriations
bill that set up and funded a National Drug Intelligence
Center (NDIC). Over the years I had noticed the lack of
cooperation and policy coordination among the proliferation
of agencies involved in the effort to counter illegal drug
trafficking. It is a simple fact of life that bureaucracies
are so turf-conscious that they frequently fail to share
information with each other even if they have the same goals.
NDIC brought together officials from all of the agencies
involved and has streamlined the antidrug intelligence effort.
As
we have seen in the investigations and revelations of the
events leading up to September 11, the failure to connect
the dots was at least partly attributable to the lack of
coordination among the many agencies and departments involved
in the intelligence component of the antiterrorism effort.
Criteria
for Deployment of U.S. Forces
The vast majority of Americans agree that the United States should maintain a
strong international military presence and be willing to use its military power
when appropriate. As Joseph S. Nye Jr. wrote: "Polls show that the American
people are neither isolationist nor eager to serve as the world's police." It
is distressing to contemplate the number of conflicts and atrocities around the
world. As the undisputed world leader, the United States will increasingly be
called upon to intervene militarily in a wide variety of situations. So we must
be extremely cautious about when, where, and for what purpose we deploy our troops.
In
the last two decades the most successful U.S. military
interventions have been those in which a clear national
security issue was involved and decisive force was used
to attain our objectives. The classic example is the
Persian Gulf War. A nation important to the United States
and NATO had been invaded and stability in a key region
of the world with vital economic resources was threatened.
The United States and its allies reacted decisively.
Congress authorized military action and the American
people overwhelmingly supported it. So did the Kuwaitis.
In the intervention in Panama, the key factors were the
long historical ties between our two countries, the strategic
importance of the Panama Canal, the stealing of the election
by Noriega and his cronies, and the mistreatment of American
citizens by Noriega's troops. Again the United States
acted decisively. Ninety percent of the Panamanian people
supported U.S. intervention. In Afghanistan our national
security was clearly jeopardized by the Taliban's provision
of a safe haven for bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist organization.
A massive bombing campaign combined with effective ground
attacks by our Afghan allies and American Special Forces
rapidly defeated the major Taliban contingents. Once
again, the vast majority of Afghans supported our efforts;
they had had enough of the oppressive policies of the
medieval-like Taliban regime.
Conversely,
when U.S. military interventions have failed, the vital
national security interests of the United States were
not involved and we did not act decisively. In Lebanon
our troops were in an untenable geographic position and
our force was not large enough to carry out the mission
effectively. In Somalia a well-meaning humanitarian intervention
ended in failure because we interjected ourselves into
a civil war. I am not arguing that we should have acted
decisively with a larger military force in either case.
As I have explained, I opposed the intervention in Somalia
from the day the decision to intervene was made.
When
the decision was made to deploy the United Nations troops
in a peacemaking role in Bosnia, the initial insertion
of those forces was tepid and they did not end the violence.
After the Dayton Accords were signed, however, a large
force was deployed, including a significant American
contingent. Those troops made it clear that if they were
fired upon, they would react massively and decisively;
they would adhere to the doctrine of disproportionate
response. Here again the Powell doctrine worked. Relative
peace ensued.
In
the air war in Serbia and Kosovo, the initial limited
air attacks escalated steadily to massive and prolonged
bombing. Once again a weak military response had to be
intensified. In the end the NATO forces had to issue
a credible threat of massive invasion by ground forces
and the people had to revolt en masse before success
was achieved.
Our
military forces have frequently been deployed for short
periods to deliver food and other supplies after a natural
disaster. Such humanitarian missions are laudable, but
they have to be chosen very carefully. Michael O'Hanlon
of the Brookings Institution has written:
For
a humanitarian intervention to be wise and ethical,
it must be
attempted only if the odds are excellent that it will make a bad situation
better and not worse. Intervening to stop Russia from killing
tens of thousands of innocent Chechens, for instance, would have
risked a major-power war between nuclear-weapon states with the
potential to kill far more people than the intervention could have
saved. Invading North Korea to bring food to its starving people
would probably precipitate all-out war on the peninsula, quite possibly
killing as many civilians in Seoul (to say nothing of soldiers on
both sides of the war) as the food aid would save in North Korea.
Entering into the Angolan civil war would force us to choose sides
between our former anti-Communist associate Jonas Savimbi, a maniacal
killer who has violated two major peace accords, and the corrupt
dos Santos government.
David
Fromkin provides a perspective on the intervention in
Somalia that
applies far beyond that particular crisis:
One
lesson of Somalia was that there is no such thing as
a purely
humanitarian intervention. A military intervention in a foreign country,
unless undertaken at the request of its government, is political.
It occurs because the United States, believing that the other country
isn't being ruled properly, acts to overthrow the local leadership; but
of course that obliges America to take over the government itself. . . .
Somalia should have taught Americans that invading, occupying
and administering a foreign country may not be as easy as it looks at
first. Above all, the lesson of Somalia was that, even in the absence
of enemy great powers . . . , America is not completely free to make
the world do as Americans wish.
In
June 2000 the New York Times Magazine quoted
Richard Holbrooke, then U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations, as saying that he disagreed with Henry Kissinger's
view that "you don't get in these things unless
your chance of success is 85 to 90 percent." He
could understand that view during the Cold War, Holbrooke
said, when "any setback to the United States was
a gain for the Soviet Union, but in the post-Cold War
world, where the United States is the single leader
and great things are expected of us, we should try
even if our chances of success are less than 50 percent."
I
have known Richard Holbrooke for many years. He is
a dynamic and courageous man. However, I disagree with
him on this issue. First of all, we must remember that
although we are the world's largest military power,
the size of our military has shrunk dramatically since
the end of the Cold War. While peacekeeping missions
may not involve a large number of troops by wartime
standards, those numbers are far from negligible. The
United States had 6,000 troops in Bosnia and 4,000
in Kosovo. Those 10,000 military personnel were overwhelmingly
from one branch—the Army. Troops sent on peacekeeping
missions serve in six-month rotations, so we are talking
about 20,000 personnel a year from one of the services.
Add those involved in training and supporting those
troops and you are talking about a fairly significant
number. A related problem is that the nature of the
peacekeeping mission inevitably causes a short-term
decline in the fighting capability of the deployed
units. In February 2001 the Third Infantry Division,
which had units deployed on a peacekeeping mission
in the Balkans, was downgraded "to the Army's
second-lowest rating for wartime readiness, effectively
removing it from its traditional role: standing by
to defend the
nation." Granted, that downgrade was temporary, only until the division
could resume its training for its traditional role, but any decline in warreadiness
is troubling, and it becomes more so when the same U.S. military units are
deployed for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions time after time.
If
serious consideration is being given to sending American
troops to a country whose importance to our national
security is not clear, it is especially important for
policy makers to ascertain the relative strength of
our interests and those of our adversaries. Nina Serafino
of the Congressional
Research Service wrote: "Some situations may not be winnable with limited
force because the opponent has a much greater interest in the outcome than
the intervening parties, and thus is willing to sustain greater costs and to
cede only in the face of a crushing defeat. Once committed to an intervention
in such circumstances, the intervening party is faced with a Hobson's choice:
to bear much higher costs than originally anticipated, or to withdraw."
As
our policy evolved in Somalia, for example, Aideed
and his clan had a much greater interest in the outcome
of events than we did. The average American was concerned
about the suffering and hunger in Somalia but couldn't
have cared less about who the clan leaders were.
I
think the greatest danger of military deployments to
countries of minimal interest to the United States'
security is the loss of credibility if we suffer setbacks
and have to withdraw. We risk being seen as an unreliable
ally by nations that are important to our national
security. And the case for military intervention for
humanitarian missions loses its strength in comparison
with the enormous effort we must commit to fighting
terrorism.
These
are the major criteria I would apply to the deployment
of U.S.
troops:
- The
mission should be related to our national security.
- The
mission should be clear and achievable.
- We
must know ahead of time the implications of failure
and being forced
to leave without achieving our objectives (the key question is not how we
get out but why we are getting in).
- The
force deployed must be large enough to achieve the
objectives with
minimal casualties.
- Decision
makers should be cautious about being overly affected
by reports
in the media.
- Rules
of engagement should be forceful and clear.
- Congress
and our allies should be consulted early and frequently.
The
Quality of America's Armed Forces
It is absolutely essential to retain high-quality personnel in our armed forces.
Over the years the quality of personnel has fluctuated. After the great performance
of U.S. troops in the 1990s, we tend to forget that in the late 1970s and early
1980s the quality of many of our personnel was a problem, morale was low, and
there was a significant drug problem. When I made an inspection trip to the
Marine Corps boot camp at Parris Island, South Carolina, in 1979, a drill instructor
said, "Congressman, I hate to tell you this, but if there was a war, I
don't believe these guys would fight." I passed his comment along to the
Marine commandant.
Shortly
after that I conducted a surprise inspection at the
Marine Corps headquarters in Virginia. I found the
morale abysmal. Marines were selling blankets and other
government gear to get money for drugs. Soon the Marine
Corps downsized by a total of 10,000 troops, removing
the least qualified. After a zero-tolerance drug policy
was instituted, the quality of our forces improved
significantly. I believe our highest priority should
be the recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel
in all the services.
Many
people simply do not realize how many personnel are
needed to conduct military operations. It would seem
that the proliferation of high-tech weapons would reduce
the number of personnel required, but that is not the
case.
During
the early days of the Persian Gulf War, we all marveled
at the pictures on our TV screens of the smart bombs
dropped down the airshaft of the Iraqi Air Defense
Headquarters and on other Iraqi military facilities.
Those missions seemed to involve only a handful of
pilots and aircraft.
What we did not see was the massive support required for success:
- The
crews of the aircraft jamming and suppressing the
Iraqi radars and communications to ensure that the
attack aircraft involved in the actual bombing could
successfully carry out their missions.
- The
crews flying the intelligence aircraft to support
the attack mission.
- The
ground crews and mechanics keeping all of these aircraft
combat ready.
- The
logisticians, perimeter defense personnel, motor
pool mechanics, ammunition technicians, cooks, chaplains,
and administrative personnel at the air bases in
Saudi Arabia.
- The
soldiers and technicians manning the Patriot anti-air
missile systems defending those bases.
In
addition to the personnel directly involved in those
operations, a vast array of other personnel labored
in support roles around the world:
- The
technicians who operated the control centers responsible
for the reconnaissance satellite systems involved
in target selection and gathering of other intelligence
data for the deployed troops.
- The
technicians who operated the control centers responsible
for the satellite signals intelligence systems.
- The
linguists and analysts who interpreted the information
received from those satellite systems.
- The
personnel that operated the Defense Department’s
international communications
network, transmitting vast amounts of data to operators in the field.
- The
personnel that ran the vast international supply
network supporting Operation Desert Storm.
An
analogous situation is the aircraft carrier task force
group whose awesome capabilities played such a central
role in the war in Afghanistan. The actual size of
an aircraft carrier task force varies with the purpose
and scope of its mission. Typically there are about
8,000 sailors in a task force—5,000 on the carrier
and 3,000 on the escort ships. These "floating
airfields" enable the United States to deploy
a great military asset to distant corners of the globe.
An
aircraft carrier typically has about 120 planes: 60
combat aircraft and 60 aircraft to serve such functions
as jamming the enemy’s radar emissions, performing
reconnaissance, bringing provisions to the task force,
and rescuing downed pilots. Many highly skilled personnel
are required to keep these aircraft operational. The
ship's communications centers and their navigation
and radar systems must be staffed twenty-four hours
a day. All of the thousands of sailors in a carrier
task force, from jet pilots to cooks, fulfill roles
required for the successful missions of the 60 combat
aircraft on the carrier.
A
global network of ground stations is processing information
from satellites and other sources to provide information
to the carrier task force. A typical U.S. manufacturing
company operates 40 hours a week—8 hours a day,
5 days a week. Many of our national defense programs
providing nonstop information to our military around
the world must operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week—168
hours a week. When vacation time and holidays are factored
in, the national security operations for receiving,
processing, and disseminating this information need
almost five shifts to carry out their duties.
Also,
a large percentage of the thousands of sailors in a
task force have spouses and children at bases back
in the States, requiring personnel to provide medical
care, housing, and other services. Those bases have
other personnel to maintain their infrastructure. The
ports and harbors where the carrier task force is based
must be dredged. When the carrier task force returns
to its home port, the planes must be repaired and upgraded
and the ships must undergo maintenance and occasional
complete overhauls. Thus, although the actual number
of naval attack aircraft in one carrier task
force is about 60, tens of thousands of support personnel
are needed to enable the pilots to carry out their
missions successfully. We must not lose sight of the
sheer size and complexity of the effort involved in
having these capabilities always available to carry
out America's national security objectives.
Airpower
Since its first use in warfare, airpower has had a significant impact on the
outcome of numerous battles and wars. Air attacks played the central role
in achieving NATO's goals in Serbia. Airpower, ranging from B-52 bomber attacks
against large troop concentrations and supply nodes to F-4 fighter aircraft,
attack helicopters, and C-130 gunships for close air support, was essential
to our effort in Vietnam. The air attacks against Libya ordered by President
Reagan ended state-sponsored terrorism by that country. In the Persian Gulf
War, weeks of the most intensive bombing since World War II inflicted extensive
damage to Saddam Hussein's defense infrastructure and significantly weakened
the Iraqi forces in Kuwait before the allied ground invasion. And in Afghanistan,
the use of smart bombs and laser guidance by ground forces to pinpoint targets
and the introduction of UAV's (unmanned aerial vehicles) armed with Hellfire
missiles helped bring an extraordinary victory over the Taliban and al-Qaeda
forces. Indeed, writes Karl Mueller, there have been "revolutionary
advances in munitions guidance, aircraft sensors, flight simulators, and
battle management, together with more evolutionary developments in airframe,
engine, and other technologies." Despite these stunning advances and
successes, I believe America must not become overconfident of the ability
of airpower to resolve complex foreign policy crises.
U.S.
forces and our South Vietnam allies did not prevail
in Vietnam, despite our overwhelming advantage in the
air. The Soviets found in Afghanistan that their air
superiority-indeed, their opponents had no air assets-could
not prevent their defeat by sophisticated anti-air
weaponry and a focused guerrilla force. In the Persian
Gulf War, despite the enormous allied bombing effort,
Kuwait was retaken by land forces in tanks and armored
vehicles in a classic ground invasion. Of the total
kills of Iraqi tanks during the Persian Gulf War, 21
percent were destroyed by air forces over forty-four
days and 79 percent by ground forces over four days.
The statistics for destroyed Iraqi artillery are similar—75
percent destroyed by ground forces and 24 percent by
air attacks. In 1998, Tomahawk cruise missiles launched
against the terrorist camps of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan
and the suspected terrorist facility in Sudan did not
achieve the intended objectives. In Serbia, despite
the fact that 40 percent of America's air assets were
used, along with a significant air contribution by
our allies, and 23,000 bombs and missiles were launched,
Milosevic backed down only after he was convinced that
a massive intervention by NATO ground forces into Kosovo
was imminent. For discussion purposes, let us assume,
as many people have done, that it was the air war alone
that caused Milosevic to back down. As John Keegan
wrote in the Wall Street Journal, "It
was the destruction of the Serb civilian infrastructure
rather than the direct attack on the Third Army that
eventually persuaded Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw
his troops."
Relying
exclusively on airpower to stop atrocities in less
developed countries is unlikely to be effective. Ivo
Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon wrote:
In
many of the worst civil and ethnic wars around the
world there are few strategic and armored targets
ripe for air attack. Coercive bombing is also unlikely
to be of much use, since atrocities are often committed
by militias or rebel forces that do not have clear
dependencies or vulnerabilities that can be targeted
by airpower. . . . A B-2 bomber simply is not a very
effective instrument to stop genocide committed largely
with machetes or machine guns. That task calls for
ground troops—and usually more rather than
less. And once troops are deployed, the aim must
be to achieve the objective decisively in order to
minimize risks to U.S. and allied forces. To do so
requires decisive force, rather than gradual escalation.
. . .
Far
from heralding a new age of humanitarian intervention,
the war in Kosovo highlights the difficulty of pursuing
such a course. The single most important lesson of
the conflict is that there is no cheap, easy way
to prevent genocide or mass killing. Airpower alone
will not generally determine what transpires on the
ground. Only when paired with ground forces—and
only if used decisively—can airpower be expected
to work. That, of course, raises the cost of using
force, making it more important that operations enjoy
international legitimacy and that allies and others
bear their full share of the burden.
Another
cautionary note about overreliance on airpower: the
United States must be careful when it decides the threshold
for intervening militarily. We
should not lower the threshold by thinking, "Since we're most likely
to suffer only minimal casualties by using airpower, we should act." We
must always strive to minimize our casualties, but making a policy decision
to intervene with airpower alone could lead to the deployment of ground
troops if our objectives are not attained through airpower alone. If the
country is of such marginal national security interest to the United States
that we would not consider deploying ground troops there otherwise, we
should think long and carefully before we send in those aircraft.
Despite
these reservations, I strongly support upgrading America's
weaponry and combat support systems. In addition to
the high-profile weapons procurement programs, the
technological capabilities of tactical intelligence,
communications, and other functions for application
in the use of future weapon systems are being increased
dramatically.
United
Nations Military Deployments
In recent years the United States' military involvements have been in concert
with the United Nations. With so many crises arising in countries outside of
our traditional vital national security interests, it is logical that the United
Nations has been the leader in developing the international community's response.
My on-site inspections and observations, however, have given me serious reservations
about the capability of the United Nations to carry out large-scale military
missions effectively, as I told President Clinton in 1993. When a peacekeeping
mission develops into a combat operation, it has crossed the line into territory
for which the UN is unequipped. I recall Speaker Tom Foley saying, "Never
shake your fist at someone first and then point your finger at them later." This
is what the United Nations has done too often. Time after time the ambitious
goals embodied in UN resolutions have outstripped the political will and capability
of the United Nations to act decisively. (It must be admitted that these impractical
resolutions have often been supported and even inspired by the United States.)
In Somalia, as I noted earlier, the United States was scaling back its role
significantly just as the UN, with the support of our government, was expanding
its goals—a recipe for disaster.
A
few years after the UN left Somalia, a UN contingent
of fifty-one Dutch soldiers was captured by Serb forces
in Bosnia. In response to their capture, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1004, which, as William
Shawcross explains, demanded that the Bosnian Serbs "leave
Srebrenica immediately. It demanded that all the parties
respect the status of Srebrenica as a safe area. It
demanded that the Bosnian Serbs release immediately
all UN personnel they had detained. It demanded immediate
access to Srebrenica for the Red Cross and other humanitarian
agencies. As the resolution was passed, General Mladic
was still holding the Dutch peacekeepers captive. .
. . The demands and the threats of the Security Council
meant nothing."
Five
years after that fiasco, in May 2000, Richard Holbrooke
reflected on a new hostage-taking in the West African
country of Sierra Leone: "I must say . . . that
the sight of UN peacekeepers being taken hostage by
murderous thugs in Sierra Leone five years to the week
after UN peacekeepers were similarly taken hostage
by murderous thugs in Bosnia is not only outrageous
but sobering."
Passing
tough-sounding resolutions that cannot or will not
be carried out has a twofold effect. The hopes of the
suffering parties are raised falsely; then, when the
resolutions and tough rhetoric are not acted upon or
ineffectively enforced, further UN pronouncements are
not taken seriously.
The
United Nations' inability to conduct military operations
effectively and the United States' understandable reluctance
to send ground forces on humanitarian missions to countries
of minimal interest to its security presents a serious
problem. A strong case can be made for the international
community to intervene to stop violence and atrocities,
but this is a moral issue, not a strategic one. I believe
that U.S. military involvement in such situations (if
it is required) should be limited to operations such
as airlift, logistics, communications, tactical intelligence,
and training. To the extent practicable, the ground
forces for these UN operations should come from nations
in the region and from developed countries whose foreign
policy embraces the military intervention. Efforts
must continue to be made to upgrade the UN's ability
to conduct these missions.
Conclusion
Martin Wolf, paraphrasing the opening of Charles Dickens's Tale of Two Cities,
gave his perspective on the twentieth century: "It was the worst of centuries.
It was the best of centuries. It was the age of progress; it was the age of madness.
Never before has humanity made such leaps in knowledge
and wealth. Never before has it suffered such cruelties and frailties." Those
few sentences capture the irony of the last century. It saw unspeakable violence
by human beings against human beings over 100 million deaths in warfare between
nations, in civil conflicts, in atrocities committed
by tyrants against their own people, and by ethnic and religious groups against
each other. But that same century brought enormous increases in longevity, health,
wealth, communications, and quality of life.
To
ensure that the scourge of terrorism is defeated and
the horrors of the twentieth century are not repeated,
it is vital that the United States conducts a vigorous
and engaged foreign policy, complemented by a superior
military capability. Richard Hart Sinnreich wrote: "Historically,
the most profound strategic transformations, from the
French Revolution to the collapse of the Soviet Union,
have burst upon the world unheralded. Not one of America’s
major military conflicts in this century was anticipated.
As late as 1991, only two years after the Iron Curtain
evaporated, America found itself at war in the Persian
Gulf with an adversary that only months earlier had
been considered a regional ally."
I
believe the most important lesson of the twentieth
century for America is that we can expect our national
security to be challenged when our military is weak
or when we are perceived as being irresolute. The meager
capability of our armed forces before World War I and
World War II and the
precipitous downsizing of our defense budget after each war should be lesson
enough. When America entered World War II in 1941 our army was seventeenth
in the world in size. Within five years after the end of World War II, we were
engaged in another major conflict in Korea. Once again we were unprepared.
(As I noted earlier, when I joined the Marine Corps as a teenager during the
Korean War, I had to wear my civilian clothes during my first two weeks in
boot camp because no uniforms were available.) In the aftermath of the Vietnam
War the quality of our military personnel declined significantly.
Although
America will be the world's only superpower for years and
decades to come, future generations should remember the words
of Loren Thompson, who wrote: "History is strewn with
the remains of great civilizations that lost the capacity
to protect themselves from external challenges. The hard part
for America, as for Rome, seems to be maintaining a sense
of purpose when threats recede. Given enough time, Americans
are masters of military mobilization and execution. Where
they have proved wanting is in preserving their might during
periods of peace."
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