| "Through
Corridors of Power offers a compelling prism through which to
view civilian policy-making toward the military and is thus a significant
contribution to the literature on civil-military affairs in Latin
America. Superbly researched and written, it draws on a vast number
of primary documents and interviews with top officials, including
President Alfonsin. It includes an excellent chapter on comparative
cases as well."-Latin American Research Review
"An innovative and thoughtful analysis of the interaction of civilian
and military elites in Argentina's 'new' democracy."-J. Samuel Fitch,
University of Colorado at Boulder
Military meddling in political affairs has long been common in
Latin America, and the recent rebirth of democracy in many countries
only heightens concern that military leaders will refuse to submit
to civilian authority. One hallmark of progress is the willingness
of the military to work through rather than around democratic institutions
in Argentina, a country with a long history of militarism.
This book examines the influence that institutions have had over
the implementation of policy in Argentina between 1983 and 1995,
revealing that policies can succeed despite military resistance.
To explain the workings of the new Argentine politics, David Pion-Berlin
draws both on archival sources and on interviews with some one hundred
civilian and military figures-from presidential advisers and members
of Congress to senior officers from all branches of the military-to
show how programs are debated by political actors and how authority
is dispersed across numerous institutions.Pion-Berlin explains how
Argentine democratic institutions mediate the sometimes differing
interests of civilian and military authorities in order to determine
whether or not soldiers succeed at defeating policies they oppose.
Eschewing conventional approaches that view the military as a domineering
power, he shows that the government can either enable or constrain
the military's authority and that the success or failure of civilian
leaders in imposing their policy on the military is a function of
the centralization of policymaking and the insulation of policymakers
from external pressures. Case studies of three issues-accountability
for human-rights violations, military budgets, and defense reform-exemplify
this process. |
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