The
prevailing interpretation of Kant's First Critique in Anglo-American
philosophy views his theory of a priori knowledge as basically
a theory about the possibility of empirical knowledge (or experience),
or the a priori conditions for that possibility (the representations
of space and time and the categories). Instead, Robert Greenberg argues
that Kant is more fundamentally concerned with the possibility of
a priori knowledge—the very possibility of the possibility
of empirical knowledge in the first place.
Greenberg advances four central theses:(1) the Critique
is primarily concerned about the possibility, or relation to objects,
of a priori, not empirical knowledge, and Kant's theory of
that possibility is defensible; (2) Kant's transcendental ontology
must be distinct from the conditions of the possibility of a
priori knowledge; (3) the functions of judgment, in Kant's discussion
of the Table of Judgements, should be seen according to his transcendental
logic as having content, not as being just logical forms of judgment
making; (4) Kant's distinction between and connection of ordering
relations (Verhaltnisse) and reference relations (Beziehungen)
have to be kept in mind to avoid misunderstanding the Critique.
At every step of the way Greenberg contrasts his view with the
major interpretations of Kant by commentators like Henry Allison,
Jonathan Bennett, Paul Guyer, and Peter Strawson. Not only does
this new approach to Kant present a strong challenge to these dominant
interpretations, but by being more true to Kant's own intent it
holds promise for making better sense out of what have been seen
as the First Critique's discordant themes.
