"This outstanding work is the first comprehensive, objective, and
truly professional study of the contribution of Che Guevara to the
theory and practice of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the twentieth
century. It is based on a thorough and careful reading of the relevant
primary sources—principally, Che's voluminous campaign diaries,
along with recently declassified CIA documents on his operations
in the Congo and Bolivia."—Neill Macaulay, University of Florida
"This is a solid, realistic study of a man, not an icon. As the
title suggests, Paul Dosal portrays the complete Che Guevara, but,
above all, he is unsurpassed in revealing Che the guerrilla soldier—the
grunt, the guy in the mud, facing death and killing ruthlessly."
—Charles Ameringer, Penn State University
The victory of Fidel Castro's rebel army in Cuba was due in no
small part to the training, strategy, and leadership provided by
Ernesto Che Guevara. Despite the deluge of biographies, memoirs,
and documentaries that appeared in 1997 on the thirtieth anniversary
of Guevara's death, his military career remains shrouded in mystery.
Comandante Che is the first book designed specifically to
provide an objective evaluation of Guevara's record as a guerrilla
soldier, commander, and strategist from his first skirmish in Cuba
to his defeat in Bolivia eleven years later.
Using new evidence from Guevara's previously unpublished campaign
diaries and declassified CIA documents, Paul Dosal reassesses Guevara's
impact as a guerrilla warrior and theorist, comparing his accomplishments
with those of other guerrilla leaders with whom he has been ranked,
including Colonel T. E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-Tung, and General Vo Nguyen
Giap.
This reassessment reveals that Guevara was often underrated as
a conventional military strategist, overrated as a guerrilla commander,
and misrepresented as a guerrilla theorist. Guevara achieved his
greatest military victory by applying a conventional military strategy
in the final stages of the Cuban Revolution, orchestrating the defensive
campaign that held off the Cuban army in the summer of 1958. As
a guerrilla commander, he scored impressive victories in ambush
after ambush in Bolivia, but in winning the battles he lost the
war. He violated most of his own precepts during the Bolivian campaign,
compelling analysts to question the validity of both his strategies
and his command skills.
Though he is credited with developing foco theory, Guevara
never attempted to advance a new theory of guerrilla warfare. He
was a fighter, not a theorist. He wanted to defeat American imperialism
by launching guerrilla campaigns simultaneously in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, but his tricontinental strategy resulted in failures
first in the Congo and then in Bolivia. Comandante Che presents
the full record of Guevara's successes and failures, separating
myth from reality about one of the twentieth century's most controversial
revolutionary figures.