Introduction

1. THE RHETORIC AS GUIDEBOOK

If we were to travel à la Hartley to the sprawling city of Rhetoric in ancient Greece, we would need a guide. We could do worse, it seems, than to take with us the popular and perennial guidebook provided by Aristotle: *On Rhetoric.* It has the advantage of having been written by one of the greatest philosophers of his age, perhaps of any age, and one who also happened to be a rough contemporary of some of the greatest orators of the ancient world: Demades, Lycurgus, and Demosthenes. Of course, Aristotle is not a native of this city and may never have lived there—that is, he was not himself a practicing rhetor. But he was an experienced teacher, an astute observer, a skilled writer, and a practiced scientific explorer and researcher—the philosophical Pausanias of the Greek intellectual landscape. And perhaps his not being a practitioner, his having remained unsullied by the seedier districts of Rhetoric, made him that much less partisan and more objective about its landmarks and dangers, its traps and tricks, its strengths and its manifest weaknesses.

Let us play out this conceit and consider the *Rhetoric* as though it were our guidebook to an unknown country. There was in his time, says Aristotle, no proper map of Rhetoric, merely some rough sketches of a few alleys through the legal district—Reply by Comparison, Recapitulation, Supplementary Narration, and the like—and most of those were inaccurate or useless. Immediately, though, Aristotle offers the generative clarity of a novel insight: the city of Rhetoric, says our guide, is in fact a colony. Rhetoric was built after the plan and in the model of its greater and
more important mother city, Dialectic. Rhetoric is the anti- to Dialectic’s strophē (1.1; 30 and n. 4). Citizens of Dialectic refer to Rhetoric as the city of “reasoning-of-a-sort.” Though sprawling and populous, Rhetoric is not so fine or august, its streets not so straight, its edifices not so secure as those of the metropole. Rhetoric was built to be populated by a rougher class of citizen—less patient, more volatile, less disciplined, and to be sure, intellectually inferior to the great families of Dialectic. Nevertheless, Aristotle asserts, in essence, that “any Greek familiar with dialectic would immediately acquire a fundamental though common notion of the nature of rhetoric” (Crem 1956, 235). The similarity is not simply structural but functional. Rhetoric does what Dialectic does: it relies on topical forms and reputable premises to invent arguments, or “proofs,” on both sides of a question or topic that has no science of its own. It is a lay art for bilateral proving.

Rhetoric is said to be notable for a pair of landmarks that are similar to originals well known to citizens of Dialectic: the two towers of induction, or epagoge (here called paradeigma), and deduction, or sullogismos (called enthumēma; 1.2.8–10; 38–39). Also recognizable will be its estimable premises (endoxa; 1.2.11–13; 40–42), though these are limited to probabilities or signs (1.2.14–18; 42–43), and the robust variety of its topical forms (1.3–1.15, 2.22–23; 46–110, 168–84), some of which are said to be quite faithful copies of the prototypes in the metropole. The twin peaks will of course be a bit of a disappointment to denizens of Dialectic, and few of Rhetoric’s premises and topoi display the structural rigor of those in Dialectic, much less the adamantine axioms and figures of Demonstration. But with these premises and topics, Rhetoric is able to produce examples and enthymemes in abundance, and with these enthymemes and examples, its citizens craft a kind of disposable knowledge that is useful for their legal, political, and ceremonial contests.

Of course, Rhetoric’s knowledge will not equal the rigorous mode of learning being built in Dialectic, much less the peerless truths forged in the capital city of Analytic. It will be a simpler, rough-and-ready kind of knowing, suitable for public use (and, many would say, abuse) by the assorted busybodies and sycophants easily found on every thoroughfare and square in Rhetoric. But this logic-of-a-sort is a central ingredient in all of the city’s primary exports: legal, deliberative, and epideictic arguments for the democratic agon. Since its founding, Rhetoric has grown organically and after its
own fashion, with the result being that Rhetoric’s layout necessarily departs
from the dialectical model Aristotle imposes.

For example, many of Rhetoric’s topoi differ from those used in Dia-
lectic, and the city’s output is found to contain several extralogical ingre-
dients, including intoxicating quantities of emotional appeal (pathos) and
character appeal (ethos). And so, having initiated this comparison, much of
Aristotle’s guidebook has to account for these differences and demonstrate
that they can be accommodated by his colonial scheme. This has led some
to view his observations as contradictory. For example, early on he says that
Rhetoric’s enthymemes and examples are suitable for emotion and charac-
ter appeals as well as for factual appeals, and he speaks of both emotion and
character as though they were just another kind of proof (1.2.3–7; 38–39).
But later he says that if you want to generate an emotion or character appeal,
you shouldn’t use enthymemes, or you’ll ruin it (3.17.8; 243). Nevertheless,
and despite these differences, we are assured by Aristotle that a familiarity
with Dialectic will prepare us admirably for a tour of Rhetoric.

Unfortunately, if we ever happen to make the trip to Rhetoric armed
with Aristotle’s guidebook—that is to say, if we read the legal and political
speeches of Antiphon, Lysias, Isaeus, Demosthenes, and the rest through
the lens of Aristotle’s Rhetoric—we are likely to become disoriented and
uncertain about how to proceed. We discover that the terrain looks very
little like that described by our guidebook. This city seems to have been
built on an entirely different plan, with strange landmarks, an unexpected
layout, and very little logic to be found—or if there is logic, it is logic of
a form quite unlike the inductions and deductions of Dialectic or the syl-
logisms of Analytic. Only with difficulty and a fertile imagination can we
convince ourselves that we are looking at a colony of Dialectic. Where are
those towering edifices Induction and Deduction? Where are the orderly
ranks of premises Major and Minor advancing every proof? Where are the
sure-footed conclusions marching forward? In fact, had we not been yoked
to the sure guidance of Aristotle, and were some questioner to ask us about
our visit to ancient Rhetoric, we wouldn’t think to compare it to Dialectic
at all.

Rhetoric does remind us of someplace, a place we find somehow very
familiar, though we can’t immediately put our finger on it. Like trying to
think of a song when another is playing, as long as we are guided by Aristo-
tle’s dialectical tour book, we won’t recall that we have actually seen terrain
like this before, many times. Only when we put down the Rhetoric and look again does it strike us: the polis of Rhetoric—which is to say, the practice of ancient Greek rhetorical artistry—does remind us of a place. Not of Dialectic but of a city much less regular, larger, more populous, more famous, and much older. If ancient rhetoric is a foreign country, we will recognize it not as a colony of Dialectic but as a suburb of Narrative.

2. RHETORIC AS NARRATIVE

Perhaps it is time to speak plainly: our understanding of rhetoric has been rendered in the language of dialectic and our view of logos described in terms of logic so frequently and for so long that we forget that this is the language and these the terms of a model, not the reality. Rhetorical logos is not logic as it is commonly understood, though it has been and can be so described. This model is useful, but as I hope to show in this work, it conceals as much as it reveals. Fortunately, there is another powerful and well-developed model for exploring and understanding rhetorical reasoning, argument, and proof. We can—and I argue that we should—begin to read early rhetoric as legal storytelling. Its legal arguments are not set in premise-conclusion (PC) logical forms, and its logic is neither formal nor universal. Ancient rhetorical reasoning arises from narratives set in adversarial juxtaposition as required by and specific to the democratic polis and its unique social, political, and legal culture.

Ancient rhetorical artistry is built on narrative artistry, and ancient rhetorical reasoning is a special form of narrative reasoning. Aristotle’s treatise, for all its inestimable and enduring value, remains a partial and incomplete guide to ancient rhetorical practice—especially legal practice—in part because the prominence that he gave to dialectic and deductive form overshadowed the centrality of story creation to rhetorical craft. This bias was exacerbated by subsequent generations of readers who assimilated Aristotelian logos to formal logic, elevated it to a dogma, and then retrofitted it onto Rhetoric’s native landscape, in the process ignoring both the patterns of narrative artistry native to all ancient oratory and the traces of narrative reasoning still latent in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Rhetoric was not built on a dialectical plan; it was just seen through dialectical lenses. And to the degree that modern rhetorical theories rely on Aristotle and on the exaggerations typical of neo-Aristotelian logos, they too will misconstrue both ancient
rhetoric and its foundational paradigm. Ancient rhetoric, we might say, is the antistrophe of poetics. In the words of James Boyd White, it “begins with story” and “it ends with story” (1985, 168).

It is story, and not dialectic, that provides the primary framework necessary for understanding ancient rhetorical artistry, including rhetorical invention and argument. The orator’s use of rhetorical techniques, from canons of speech, parts of speech, the many terms and concepts pertaining to appeals, and tropes and figures to characteristics of the speaker, the audience, the opponent, the case and issue, the situation, the purpose, the genre, and the larger social and cultural context, including the nature of the persuasive goal itself—all of these will be significantly clarified and brought into an easily assimilated and productive whole when we begin with a narrative framework and an orientation toward story. We can paraphrase Bennet and Feldman to say that the ancient legal trial, and ancient rhetorical artistry more generally, “is organized around storytelling” (2014, 3).8

It will be helpful to begin by defining some terms. By ancient rhetorical artistry, I do not mean “theory.” The term theory will immediately be read as meaning (above all) Aristotle, and then Plato, the sophists, and perhaps Isocrates, Cicero, and other writers of treatises, and with them the whole panoply of neo-Aristotelian and classical rhetorical terms and systems. I will speak of Aristotle in chapters 3 and 4, but I do not mean for this work to be a commentary on ancient rhetorical theory, much less a commentary on Aristotle.

Nor do I mean simply “oratory” or “rhetorical practice,” as represented in the speeches of a Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato, Thucydides, Lysias, Antiphon, Demosthenes, or Cicero. I will refer to oratory in order to describe an alternative approach to rhetorical reasoning, but I am not claiming simply that orators used narratives. I argue rather that orators developed a stable set of rhetorical/narrative techniques prior to and independent of later theory, that this technical ability was rhetorical (not simply pre- or protorhetoric or eloquence), and that this body of knowledge was fundamentally rooted in the skill of telling a good story. I mean to explore the detectable regularities of expertise that lie beyond theory and the treatise.

These techniques constituted a type of knowledge that could be called theory, though it was never encoded in any treatise and cannot be cleanly abstracted from its cultural and legal setting. The process of encoding and theorizing this knowledge, as by Aristotle, resulted in its being distorted.
I will refer to it instead as artistry: situated knowledge derived from and oriented toward practical experience. These techniques were known in one form by experienced speakers and speechwriters and in another by experienced auditors of public oratory, especially in ancient democracies like Athens. This is what Bourdieu might call the regularities of a habitus, the logic of practice, a “feel for the game,” or “practical mastery” (1990, 66–67).

Narrative and story are famously fraught terms; their meanings are field-dependent, and their boundaries, features, and differences are difficult to capture. To make it more difficult, I’ll be using a set of fairly idiosyncratic definitions. By narrative, I mean any text that prompts in the audience a story. By story, I mean the experiencing of a plot by an audience immersed in a normative storyworld. By plot, I mean the linked actions and consequences of humanlike actors whose telling prompts a holistic and teleologically oriented response in the audience, from an initiating or catalyzing state in the beginning; to one or more intermediate, delaying, or transforming states in the middle; to a concluding or resolving state that satisfies the others at the end. The former brings about the latter, and the latter resolves and explains the former. Together they form a bounded unity that can be seen “in a single glance” (Mink 1970, 554).

Students of Aristotle will recognize in this the movement described in the Poetics (7), though in this case, we look not for the events that initiate, continue, or end the action but rather for the events that initiate and orient the audience’s response. Plot will name the connected set of events, characters, choices, and actions that prompts this responsive cycle, cadence, or períodos. This cycle takes up the whole of human experience; it is at once cognitive and inferential, affective and emotional, appetitive and aesthetic, ethical and normative. These layers are interconnected: cognitive curiosity and reasoning generate emotional and aesthetic expectations and responses, which themselves trigger normative judgments.

If a story is the full experience of movement prompted by a plot set in a storyworld, then a narrative is any text that prompts such a story movement, however short or fragmentary. Hemingway’s alleged six words count as narrative because they prompt, even if they do not describe, a story:


This text reads like a classified advertisement. It mentions no characters, no action, no sequence or causation, but it is a narrative because it is capable
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of prompting in audiences a plot cycle and thus a story, even if most of this plot and story must be inferred by the reader. It evokes characters, linked events, emotion, sympathy, and in the taking out of the ad and sale of the shoes, a kind of tragic resolution, a letting go.

I use this definition because I will be focused on the rhetorical features of legal narratives. The kinds of stories I am interested in, the kinds of stories that ancient rhetoric concerns itself with, are anthropocentric: they involve humans or nonhuman actors that are given human characteristics and are oriented toward a human lifeworld. I will be concerned with the ethically ordered storyworld, the nomos, within which humans act. This is the realm of adversarial narratives, of what Lucaites and Condit (1985) call “rhetorical narratives,” and of legal stories.

Ancient Greek rhetoric is the art of legal storytelling. Not only did orators regularly deliver narratives, but every nonnarrative portion of an ancient speech either refers to an existing narrative or is built upon it. In the same way, decisions made by juries or assemblies depend upon their understanding and acceptance of a logos as the narrative account. One of the first and most important tasks facing an orator or speechwriter was discovering and assembling a set of facts that was capable of supporting a plot and thus capable of generating a story of the case, and one of the most important aspects of a successful story was the discovery and arrangement of narrative details that could catalyze a complete intellectual, emotional, sensory, and normative periodos, the story movement. The speaker sought to immerse the listener in this movement, to make it not just a speech, not just a narrative, but a story experience.

The most reliable and powerful way for an ancient orator to find and utilize all the “available means of persuasion” was to find the legally sanctioned story. Every one of the many familiar and frequently individualized concepts and terms that were familiar to ancient rhetorical theory gains clarity and power when it is situated within an overarching framework of legal narrative, and each of these elements achieves its full effect only in coordination with other elements as part of a larger narrative whole.

Ethos will name portrayals of character within a narrative. The ethos of the speaker will be shaped by his portrayal of the first-person narrator as a character, and the ethos of this character will be shaped by his narrated motives, choices, actions, and words; his relationship to other characters; and his contribution to the plot. Pathos is also aroused primarily through
story—through the normative motives and choices of characters embedded within a storyworld; through their actions and the consequences of those actions; through what they want, what they do, and what is done to them; and through the plot and its manipulation of time and sequencing of anticipation, delay, suspense, surprise, and resolution. Rhetorical situations will largely be narrative situations, the world in which the narrative is set will merge with the world of the jury and their deliberations, and the world they imaginatively inhabit as auditors will reveal itself to be continuous with the world where they live as participants and judges. They will carry out the final act of a story-become-drama in which they have a pivotal role.

Similarly, a narrative framework will encourage us to view other rhetorical concepts in the context of story: rhetorical kairos as the opportunity for action and advantage presented by the unfolding of a plot, by the decisive moments recognized and acted upon by characters in the narrative, and by participants in the courtroom drama. Enargeia, ekphrasis, and phantasia will all make sense as the narrative creation of a storyworld that listeners can imaginatively inhabit and experience as virtual witnesses. The parts of the speech will be understood to prepare the audience for the narrative and its proper conclusion and to help the audience interpret this narrative correctly, see it clearly, and accept it as the only possible account. The argument portion of a speech, the confirmation and refutation, is required by the need to comment on the story, to highlight its coherence, and to demonstrate the impossibility of the opposing narrative.

3. NARRATIVE REASONING

In the same way, logos will refer primarily not to formal logic, to deduction and induction, but to narrative reasoning about the facts of a case. I will be interested in how orators used narratives to argue, specifically to argue against opposing narratives. This will require attending to inference-making and to the space or “gap” between what is said and what is inferred and imagined, including the gap between the narratives as told and the story as felt and experienced. Based on what the speaker says, the jurors attempt to think, feel, and experience what “really happened” beyond the narrative and within the parameters of the law. To do so, they make inferences from important plot details in the narrative—scenes, characters, acts, motives, instruments—to their own internal feel for “the story.” These inferences
are the links that prompt additional known and felt but unnarrated story features that fill out and give meaning to the story. These links connect narrated and unnarrated details together into a complete and fully experienced whole, and they connect this felt story with other similar and familiar storyforms. Narrative linking is the body of rhetoric.

Terms like *logos*, *logic*, and *syllogism* can refer to a range of different activities and call up a number of different models. They traditionally refer to the serial laying down of propositions that lead to a conclusion or to the rules or abstract models governing the formation of this series. We could call this a formal model of reasoning. But logos can also refer more broadly to the process of explanation, of making links or inferences between one thing and the next, and to the audience’s ability to understand and accept something as true or likely based on something else that has been said or understood. A logos is an account, a story, and a narrative—especially a narrative that seeks to explain.¹¹

Audiences make inferences not only from premises to conclusions but from one portion of a narrative to another and from stated narrative elements to unstated story elements: from scene to character and from character to motive, from motive to choice and action, and from choice, action, and consequence to aesthetic and moral judgment. Audiences reason from facts that are admitted or proven to those that cannot be proven or that are disputed and from these to imagined scenes, emotions, attitudes, character assessments, and aesthetic and moral judgments. *Narrative reasoning* means the following of narrative details to locate or invent links among story elements and from story elements to the outside world.

Rhetorical reasoning is necessarily narrative reasoning because the issues taken up by ancient rhetoric, unlike the issues taken up by dialectical argument or logic, are necessarily situated within the human lifeworld that stories evoke. Rhetorical reasoning is temporally and spatially situated reasoning about human events and their consequences. It must take into account “the facts,” and these facts link human actions, motives, and goals to choices and consequences, and they link the reasoning of its actors to a course of action in time and space. They link the actions of characters to the interpretations and choices of others, and they link the narrative told to the story felt and to the myths of a culture and these to the judgment of the audience. Rhetorical logos is situated human reasoning about situated humans and their reasoning. Every rhetorical argument will involve
some form of narrative element. And since narratives prompt a holistic response in audiences, every aspect of this human response—cognitive, emotional, characterological, kinesthetic, and aesthetic—will be involved in rhetorical reasoning.

Rhetorical reasoning is also always normative reasoning. These characters, the speakers who conjure them, and the auditors who pass judgment on them are all embedded within a nomos—a world not of “one damn thing after another” but of patterns formed by an established hierarchy of significance, a moral order. Rhetorical narratives unfold in the context of this culturally sanctioned order and the archetypal or foundational “myths” or scripts that populate this nomos and give it life. Things happen for a reason, and similar things can be expected to happen again. We can guess what probably happened based on what usually happens, on who we are and who they are, and we can respond to what happened based on what ought to happen. We make ethical, legal, and practical judgments of right and wrong, innocence and guilt, expedience and inexpedience, or praise and blame by drawing on our knowledge of our normative world—some of which is encoded in law, written and unwritten—and on our attitude toward the law. Most of this knowledge is encoded as story: both the daily expectations of character, traits, and social scripts and the archetypal storyforms that come from foundational myths.

It is this order that makes possible normative decisions about what ought to happen in a particular case, and these decisions in turn rest upon the narrative construction of a storyworld. In fact, narrative is the only way to immerse an audience within a nomos. No legal or deliberative case can be decided outside an accepted moral order within which a set of facts and a legal instrument can be situated and applied, and no moral order can be invoked without in some way calling up for the audience a storyworld within which are situated nested strata of mythic, historical, and legal narratives.

Thus narratives prompt a wide range of inferences, from a stated set of facts to the felt and imagined storyworld in which the narrative occurs, from an understanding of “real life” and how it unfolds to the emotional and characterological responses to the stated and inferred facts, from the narrative as heard to ethical and aesthetic judgments about the story and its proper end. The speaker must convey and the audience must grasp what happened in the context of what happens (typically or normatively),
what is happening (now), and what will or ought to happen (in the future). The verdict of the jury is based on the story that they infer from the narrative told and the arguments about it and the fit of that story with a law and a way of life.

But the range of possible inferences in a given narrative will always be much larger than the number of relevant inferences that were intended by the narrator to produce the proper reading. If the plot traces the thread of linked actions that complete the story, connecting the end to the beginning, then the speaker will want to generate a parallel thread of audience response, restricting the inferences, reactions, and judgments that the audience makes to those that forward the plot. The speaker will want a way to highlight or mark important factual statements so that the listeners notice them and form the relevant links between and among them, tying the speaker to the narrator, his account to the law, and his actions to the proper verdict. This narrative inference marker is what I will call oratorical enthymizing, the narrative enthymeme, or simply 1.0.

This is the enthymeme of early rhetorical practice and artistry. This early enthymeme began not as a truncated syllogism, an argument missing a piece, or as a rhetorically salient ideological silence but as a moment of narrative reasoning—a technique for prompting and guiding narrative inference-making in legal storytelling. With the enthymeme, the speaker draws the attention of the audience to a narrative detail in order to highlight its significance, to clarify its meaning and narrow its effect, and to enhance the plausibility of the plot and the effectiveness of the story. The enthymeme is a rhetorical tool of adversarial narrative.

Detective fictions are an excellent place to find this kind of enthymizing. They are adversarial in the sense that they develop an ambiguous set of details that can support two or more possible narratives, only one of which can be true. The detective (like Sherlock Holmes) can then enthymize, or explain and interpret, key details (for Watson and the reader), showing what they mean and how they link together—at the same time making all other narrative interpretations impossible.

For example, at the beginning of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s 1893 short story “Silver Blaze,” a prize racehorse has been stolen from the King’s Pyland training stables just a week before the Wessex Cup, an important race in which he was to run as the favorite. Tavistock, the nearest town, was two miles away, as was Capleton, a larger training establishment. Three stable
boys worked at King’s Pyland stables. On the evening of the crime, two of the stable hands had a supper of curried mutton in the trainer’s kitchen. The third, Hunter, was on guard, so the maid brought his supper to the stable. As she was returning to the house, a stranger and track agent, a Mr. Fitzroy Simpson, arrived at the stable wearing a cravat and carrying a cane. He attempted to bribe Hunter for information on the horse but was chased away by Hunter and the stable hound. Hunter and the dog returned to the stable, where Hunter finished his supper, locked the door, and went to sleep. The other boys slept in the loft.

During the night, Silver Blaze went missing along with his trainer, John Straker. Hunter was found the next morning “in a state of absolute stupor” (2005, 394). He had obviously been drugged and remembered nothing. Simpson was apprehended the next day by Inspector Gregory, who was assigned to the case. Simpson had in his possession his walking stick with a large, heavy head, but no cravat.

Straker was found a quarter mile from the stable in a depression on the moor, dead. His forehead had been crushed by a heavy weapon and his thigh lacerated by a sharp instrument. He held in one hand a bloody surgical knife and in the other a cravat that Hunter positively identified as having been worn by Simpson. The newspapers and Inspector Gregory suspect that Simpson stole the horse and killed Straker, perhaps accidentally in a scuffle. Holmes visits the scene of the crime and speaks to the principles. With this information and a few other details (including a clothing receipt found in the pocket of Straker’s coat) in hand, Holmes decides to return to London. Watson reacts: “I was thunderstruck by my friend’s words. We had only been in Devonshire a few hours, and that he should give up on an investigation which he had begun so brilliantly was quite incomprehensible to me” (410).

Before his departure, Holmes guarantees to Colonel Ross (Silver Blaze’s owner) that the horse would run in the Wessex Cup and recommends to Inspector Gregory that the inspector see about a “singular epidemic” of lameness in the area sheep.

“You consider this to be important?” asks the inspector.

“Exceedingly so,” Holmes replies.

When the inspector asks whether there is “any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention,” Holmes points “to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time,” says the inspector.
“That was the curious incident,” replies Holmes (411).

Holmes returns to London and four days later travels to Winchester for the race. Silver Blaze, his characteristic white markings hidden by brown dye, wins. On the train back to London, Holmes explains himself just as an attorney would do in a closing argument or a rhetor in the argument portion of his speech. Holmes calls attention to important details and explains their meaning to quickly construct a coherent, plausible, and complete story. Two details were crucial for Holmes in this case. First, the curious incident: the stable boys reported hearing nothing during the night, but if the thief had been a stranger, the dog would have barked. Second, the drugging of Hunter. Holmes knows that curried mutton is one of a few dishes that would mask the taste of opium. The other boys suffered no ill effects, so the opium was introduced only onto Hunter’s plate by someone who knew or planned that a curried dish would be served. The thief must have been in the household, and suspicion falls upon Straker himself.

The knife found in Straker’s hand, the receipt in his pocket, and the lame sheep explain the motive and the events of the evening in question: he was planning to inflict “a slight nick upon the tendons of the horse’s ham, and to do it subcutaneously, so as to leave no trace” (417). Straker would bet against, Silver Blaze would lose the race, and the lameness would be put down to a strain. He took the horse out to the moor for the surgery but practiced on the sheep first. The clothing receipt provided the motive: it was for an expensive dress that did not belong to his wife. Straker fell behind buying expensive dresses for his mistress and needed the winnings. “Wonderful!” exclaims the colonel. “You have made it perfectly clear, Mr. Holmes” (418).12

The process of seeing a series of apparently inconsequential details take on meaning and watching each piece fall into place to form a complete and credible story is indeed wonderful. It is intellectually, emotionally, and morally rewarding to see how the pieces fit, the mystery solved, the criminal found out. And it is persuasive. Feeling the suspense of the story build and then resolve as its details are explained, questions are answered, and plot comes into focus is aesthetically satisfying as well. All of this is accomplished by narrating a series of details and then enthymizing some of them to reveal how they link up into an experiential whole, a story. The enthymemes link the details to their meanings, but they also link them to
each other and to familiar storyforms. The expensive mistress who drives a simple man to crime and the easy-money or gambling scheme gone wrong are common enough moralizing plot structures to make this case readily grasped and easily believed, at least for the nineteenth-century British imagination.

4. THE QUESTION OF THE ENTHYMEME

What then was an Enthymeme? Oxford! Thou wilt think us mad to ask.

—DE QUINCEY (1897)

Of course, this “narrative enthymeme” is not the enthymeme of Aristotle (what I will call 2.0). I will argue in chapters 3 and 4 that Aristotle’s enthymeme as a topical deduction is a good deal more flexible and unstructured than the truncated syllogism of traditional and current scholarship (which I will call the “standard view,” or 3.0). In fact, although Aristotle’s discussion of the enthymeme deflects from a narrative understanding of rhetorical artistry, it does not preclude such an understanding. Aristotle’s rhetorical topoi cannot all be reduced to syllogistic form, but they are largely compatible with a narrative view of rhetorical reasoning. Still, it must be admitted that Aristotle’s premise-driven, deductive model of syllogismos has historically led us away rather than toward a narrative framework for rhetorical inference. Neither is the oratorical enthymeme much like 3.0, the modern audience-added, missing-piece argument (chapters 1 and 2) or its later modifications of Bitzer (3.1) or Barthes (3.2). These and other manifestations of the neo-Aristotelian enthymeme have dominated scholarship for centuries, but they are in their own ways more restrictive, less cogent, and less useful even than Aristotle. They cannot adequately represent how orators argued.

Unfortunately, Aristotelian views dominate the discussion of this technique. In fact, he has been credited with inventing the enthymeme, and his Rhetoric is universally accepted as the authoritative source on the subject. But the enthymeme was developed and used by orators long before Aristotle’s treatise. I am saying not only that early Greek orators used enthymemes to guide narrative reasoning and that the enthymemes they used differed from Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian models but that they did so as a conscious and deliberate rhetorical technique, as artistry. Understanding
the early history of rhetorical artistry through the lens of narrative provides a fresh perspective on the “body of persuasion,” as it does on every other aspect of rhetorical artistry.

There are thus three different models of the enthymeme to consider: the traditional truncated syllogism or argument missing a piece (3.0), the Aristotelian topical deduction (2.0), and what I am for now calling the narrative enthymeme (1.0). The history of the enthymeme is long, its traditional formulation popular, its Aristotelian pedigree well established, and the problems with this formulation and its pedigree well rehearsed. But the enthymeme’s history, the reasons for its popularity, and the problems with its formulation have not yet been explored in the context of an alternative model based on ancient oratorical practice. Therefore, it will be worth reviewing each of these theoretical models, 3.0 and 2.0, before introducing 1.0, the narrative enthymeme. I will address them in a historically reverse order here, beginning with the standard view (3.0) and then turning to Aristotle (2.0) and finally to ancient oratory (1.0).

This will not be a complete reinvention: 1.0 will introduce important alterations to a traditional understanding of the enthymeme, but the narrative enthymeme has some important elements in common with prior theoretical concretions. Most importantly, they all place inference-making at the center of rhetorical artistry, and they all attempt to describe the particular features of rhetorical inference-making to answer the question, What is specific about the reasoning process in the domain of rhetoric? Since I will be explicitly challenging the traditional PC framework, I will use the term *inference* in its broadest possible sense, but I claim Aristotelian authority for doing so. What Aristotle says about the enthymeme at *Rhetoric* 1.2.9 will serve as a satisfactory definition: “To show that if some things are so, something else beyond them results from these because they are true, either universally or for the most part.”

The central focus of any study of the enthymeme, and of rhetorical artistry generally, has to include this central process by which something results in the audience from some other things being shown by the speaker to be so. We typically translate and interpret this definition in the language of premises and conclusions, but Aristotle avoids this terminology. *Sullologismo* here is not restricted to any logical form; it can apply as well to narrative as to deduction. An action can be seen to result from a motive and an opportunity, a character trait or moral quality from a repeated action,
the proper ending of a story from its beginning and middle, the meaning of an earlier action from a later result. Aristotle rightly places the inferential move at the center of persuasive artistry, and he wisely keeps his definition of inference-making as broad and all-encompassing as possible, even if this breadth will subsequently be compromised by a commitment to deductive topical forms. We could with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca say that the narrative enthymeme forms a liaison between some narrative fact or detail and another—between narrative fact and storyworld, real world, or audience response.

3.0 defines inference even more narrowly in syllogistic terms that are entirely inappropriate to ancient rhetorical practice. 3.0 is described as a conclusion from a premise; 1.0, on the other hand, leaves the nature of the inference rather broadly unspecified other than saying that it arises from a plot set in a human storyworld. If it arises from strings of premises, these strings are simply the stated and imagined details of a narrative. They have no preordained formal requirements in order to qualify as an inference. Plus, in narratives, the rational or cognitive element of reasoning cannot be separated from other aspects of the inferential movement. A narrative inference will include every kind of effect that an audience thinks, feels, and experiences in the storyworld and that they receive from the narrative that is told. It is not restricted to “logical” conclusions understood as mentally affirmed propositions. If the “things” that are “the case” are told in a narrative, then the “things that result” will include emotional reactions, assessments of character, sensations, moral and aesthetic judgments, and attitudes as well as mental beliefs or affirmations of truth.

Thus inference-making as an element of rhetorical artistry does not require that the “things that result” be articulated as propositions or even that they take a verbal form at all (e.g., rather than arising as an attitude, emotion, desire, or aversion; a mental model or imagined scene or object; or a moral or aesthetic feeling or movement). Inference-making will have to involve all manner of narrative effects, including many (though perhaps not all) forms of implication, suggestion, association, and bodily affect, all of which lie outside the rigidly formal PC model ensconced in 3.0 and suggested by Aristotle more loosely as 2.0.

There are other similarities among 3.0, 2.0, and 1.0. All are said to include items that are left unstated. The enthymeme is able to prompt a response in the audience beyond what was said. 3.0 describes this in terms
of the “truncated” or “suppressed” major premise of a syllogism that is known as a popular opinion or cultural assumption (doxa or endoxa). 2.0 says simply that for rhetorical arguments, not all of the premises that are strictly necessary for reaching a conclusion must be stated or demonstrated and that we should use as few as necessary. 1.0 similarly works across “gaps” that separate the narrative as told from the story as experienced. Narrative gaps are a ubiquitous feature of narratives, and they are central to story comprehension and enjoyment.

In legal stories, narrative gaps separate facts that can be proven or attested to and those that can only be inferred and felt. More generally, they separate the end of the narrative as told by the narrator from the conclusion of the story and its periodos that the jury must grasp and put into effect. Narrative enthymemes guide audiences to see the proper narrative details in the proper light and to draw from them just those inferences and responses that will further the plot and win the verdict. Only by seeing rhetoric as situated within narrative can we see rhetorical artistry in the proper light and the enthymeme for what it is.

5. PLAN OF THE PRESENT WORK

My goal in this work, then, will be to describe the narrative enthymeme as it was developed by practiced Greek logographers for adversarial legal arguments and to demonstrate regularities of use that suggest the development of a deliberate technique. Before I unpack this argument, I’ll want to clear the space for it, space currently occupied by the two currently operative models of the enthymeme: 3.0 and 2.0. To that end, I will begin in chapters 1 and 2 with a discussion of the familiar and traditional neo-Aristotelian truncated-syllogism enthymeme. The standard view of the enthymeme—though well known and well supported in the fields of logic, argumentation theory, rhetoric, and composition and communication—is entirely inappropriate to ancient Greek oratory and makes a poor model of rhetorical argument generally.

A full exploration of the development of 3.0, its attractions, and its flaws has not yet been compiled, but some of the problems with 3.0 are well rehearsed. Despite this, 3.0 remains the standard view: it is taught in textbooks, advertised on rhetoric websites, applied in rhetorical criticism, and explored in scholarly research. In light of this continued support, a fuller
exploration of its development, its flaws, and its improbable survival seems warranted. Thus in part 1, I will examine 3.0. In chapter 1, I’ll describe the standard view and review the history of this rhetorical concept to understand how it evolved from its Aristotelian origins and how it more recently accrued its contemporary features, and I’ll explore some reasons for its current appeal. Then in chapter 2, I will review some of its practical difficulties. I want to demonstrate that this enthymeme survives not because it is useful or faithful to Aristotle but because it is old and familiar, traditional and teachable.

In part 2, I turn more specifically to Aristotle to explain in some detail what Aristotle says about the enthymeme. In chapter 3, I will attempt to show that enthumēma is not a kind of syllogism; it is simply explanatory reasoning. It has no essential features that differentiate it from dialectical sullogismos. Also, because sullogismos itself means not “syllogism” but “explanatory reasoning,” 2.0 is not a syllogism at all. Thus it is not limited to two premises, and its so-called missing premise is misleading at best and irrelevant at worst as a defining feature of the Aristotelian enthymeme. 2.0 is not syllogistic but topical. In fact, the rhetorical topics from which enthymemes are drawn are much more adaptable to a narrative framework than they are to a syllogistic one. While Aristotle’s language leads us to view instances of rhetorical reasoning as “like” the so-called dialectical syllogism, in fact his rhetorical topics (unlike his dialectical topics) retain the imprint of their narrative origins.

In chapter 4, I discuss the limitations of Aristotle’s enthymeme, rhetorikos sullogismos. Unfortunately, Aristotle’s discussion of the enthymeme tacitly suppresses a narrative approach to rhetorical argument in part because he limits logos to sullogismos and sullogisimos to topical forms. His unit of analysis is not the narrative and its plot but the PC structure and its form. For this reason, even though 2.0 is theoretically more defensible and practically more flexible than 3.0, as a model of rhetorical reasoning, it remains unsatisfactory and misleading. Aristotle was committed to understanding rhetoric from the perspective of the dialectical framework of the Topics, but dialectic is not the best lens through which to view ancient legal rhetoric. It is unfortunate that Aristotle made this choice because he had at his disposal a perfectly good and more serviceable avenue for approaching rhetoric in his Poetics. Rhetoric is not the antistrophe of dialectic; it is an application of narrative.
I suspect that previous criticisms of the standard view have failed to erode its popularity in part because there has been, up to now, no good replacement for it. 2.0 is underdeveloped, ambiguous, in parts contradictory, difficult to apply to most rhetorical texts, and unsatisfying either as a productive technique or as an analytical tool, whereas 3.0 is clear, precise, teachable, and seems to state more explicitly what Aristotle must have meant. That it is wrong seems not to be much of a drawback. Even if you can’t use it to create arguments, you can easily impose it upon unwary primary texts and students—and always with positive results. It has the support of centuries of scholarly authority, and it adapts itself well to current trends.

To claim that 3.0 bastardizes Aristotle and has marginal relevance to how people actually argue or persuade—and therefore little legitimate rhetorical value—and to claim that 2.0 itself mischaracterizes ancient rhetorical practice and ought to be set aside without not only demonstrating its failings but also offering a better model would be highly impolitic and would leave us with a rather disappointing gap in our rhetorical lexicon. If 3.0 is not Aristotelian, and if both 2.0 and 3.0 misrepresent the nature of ancient rhetorical reasoning, what, then, is the enthymeme? In part 3, I put forward my answer to this question by returning to the opening argument: it is a linking technique developed by orators specifically for the adversarial narratives of a legal trial.

In chapter 5, I look at the language of the orators that gave rise to the term enthymeme, deriving it not from the “passional” thumos or the missing premise that the audience already has “in mind” (en-thumos)” but from the verb enthumeisthai, or “enthymize,” a term frequently used by the orators. I examine the variety of meanings and the patterns of use that led to the rise of this term as a deliberate rhetorical (and narrative) move. In chapter 6, I look at some examples of enthymizing in the context of a speech, a narrative, and a case to illustrate the varieties of its use. Then in chapter 7, I turn to the terms of narrative theory and to features of the contest or game to see whether these approaches can contribute to our understanding of rhetorical reasoning. Finally, in chapters 8 and 9, I nominate Lysias as an early inventor of the enthymeme. I argue that in Lysias 1, On the Death of Eratosthenes, Lysias explicitly proposes the enthymeme as a kind of reasoning and a rhetorical skill that is central not only to legal oratory but to
life in a secure household and a robust democratic polis. This disarmingly simple and entertaining speech includes enthymizing, names enthymizing and highlights it as a rhetorical skill, teaches students what it is and how it works, and then encourages students to produce their own. It is Lysias, I suggest, who put 1.0 on the map. The conclusion will summarize these findings and offer a few suggestions for further work.