Introduction

Term Limits

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Be they designated units of meaning, durative appointments, or conditions of an agreement, terms have endpoints. The matter of the ancient rhetorical terms that have organized Rhetorical Studies dramatizes the point. What are their limits? How much can they be stretched, conceptually and chronologically? When do they exceed their own edges? Are there areas into which they can never reach? For how long must we be beholden to ancient rhetorical terms? Because endpoints can be improperly negotiated when originating conditions are unclear, it makes sense to determine from the outset when and how ancient rhetorical terms entered Rhetorical Studies in the first place.

The rhetorical strain of what would become Communication Studies developed in the United States when, in the mid-1910s, a group of professors of speech invented a tradition originating in classical Athens—and inserted themselves into it. The discipline’s earliest scholars established themselves as such by intentionally annexing the authority of Protagoras, Gorgias, Isocrates, and Plato. The rhetorical strain of English emerged when a group of English professors who taught composition turned to rhetoric—in particular, to ancient rhetoric—in the 1960s, thinking it might provide “practical guidance” to people who took teaching composition seriously and “intellectual substance” with which to ward off dismissive administrators or departmental colleagues in literature. These professors readily connected with rhetoricians in Speech Communication, who, by that time, had been publishing about rhetoric in their own disciplinary journals for decades. According to one authoritative chronicle of those years, “classical rhetoric became an important element of this new cooperation.” Part of the reason
was that, at that time, nobody else in academe was laying claim to ancient rhetoric; even among classicists the concerted study of rhetoric was (and remains) rare.

These many years later, Rhetorical Studies is one of very few intellectual formations that continues to understand and to authorize itself largely through its own originary assertions; that is, that the theory-based practice of “Public Address,” or “Communication,” or “Rhetorical Studies” started in ancient Athens, and that its rhetorical terms are therefore our terms. A primary index of that understanding is a small subset of ancient Greek rhetorical terms—such as *technē* (system, art), *doxa* (opinion, reputation), *pathos* (emotion)—that features frequently in seminar discussions, conference papers, and published scholarship. Generally, rhetoricians are expected not only to recognize those ancient terms but also to develop them through application to historical and contemporary forms and instances of symbolic action.

Certainly, then, such terms appear in conversations and publications that attend to ancient texts and contexts to retrieve from them fine-grained detail about those terms. Far more commonly, though, the terms appear in scholarship not working with ancient texts much (or at all). There they receive theoretical development far beyond what ancient texts offer. Although familiar ancient terms gain new folds and depths through both kinds of work, any given term has semantic recalcitrance, meaning it cannot be pushed too far. For rhetoricians who think these recurring ancient terms have outlived their usefulness or flat-out can never faithfully apply to the communicative realities of certain people or groups, even new takes on the same old terms do not go far enough. A related and toxic problem is that inquiries conducted by rhetoricians trained in Rhetorical Studies may be deemed insufficiently disciplinary (and disciplined) when lacking familiar ancient rhetorical terms.

Rhetoric’s technical vocabulary has long been a site of struggle. From what seems to be the first time a teacher of speaking and writing mentions rhetoric handbooks (known as *technai*), already the vocabulary systems of public communication are said to result from a bad choice of technical terms. In the early fourth century BCE, Isocrates points to an earlier generation who wrote handbooks in which they “took it upon themselves to teach forensics, and picked hard to manage words,” the kind that seemed more in line with those against education in speaking than those for it.
himself prioritizes three principles, which take the form of terms: *to prepon* (the appropriate), *ho kairos* (the timely), and *ho kainos* (the new). Appraising as a whole the growing number of stipulated technical terms in the time of Isocrates, David Timmerman and Edward Schiappa credit the terms with bringing rhetoric into being. In other words, the concept trails behind the terminology it organizes, with the terms leading the way. That seems to be the case now, too: ancient technical terms are sign evidence *par excellence* that “rhetorical study” is happening. It is, of course, a contestable claim—or, at least, it ought to be.

For us in the twenty-first century, that these technical terms are in ancient Greek or Latin makes them stick out in a way different from most other disciplinary terminologies. Yet, writing in Latin in the first century BCE about rhetoric’s technical vocabulary, Cicero observes that “even the manuals of rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology.” The Greekness and Latinity of rhetoric’s technical terms would have made them recede into the Greek and Latin spoken in the first century. Still, the terms had specialized meanings to which even knowledge of ancient Greek and Latin in themselves did not grant access. The meanings of these terms have always been adopted specially, as well as adapted to new cultures and circumstances.

The proliferation of words with particular meanings for rhetorical study and practice meant rhetorical handbooks in ancient Greek and in Latin had a lot to hold, teachers had a lot to command, and students had a lot to learn. In “The Old Rhetoric: an aide-mémoire,” Roland Barthes observes that “all the treatises of Antiquity, especially the post-Aristotelian ones, show an obsession with classification (the very term of *partitio* in oratory is an example): rhetoric openly offers itself as a classification (of materials, of rules, of parts, of genres, of styles).” In his thesaurus of technical terms at the back of his book *Rhetoric in Antiquity*, Laurent Pernot describes them as “a network taking the form of a multitude of lists.” He describes the lists as “juxtaposed, superimposed, and mesh[ed] with one another,” as “endlessly modified, abridged, lengthened, debated,” and as full of “numerous divergences on points of details among authors, not to mention actual contradictions between one list and another.” There are a lot of terms to know, not to mention their dynamic or agonistic interrelationships. Samuel Butler, in his 1663 poem *Hudibras*, carped that “for all a rhetorician’s rules
teach nothing but to name his tools.” The truth is, though, that despite there being dozens upon dozens of ancient rhetorical terms that crisscross a chronological and cultural range of ancient theorists, a few terms associated with Aristotle dominate US American rhetorical studies, especially the three genres he articulates (usually translated as “judicial,” “deliberative,” and “epideictic”) and the three items generally called “proofs” or “means of persuasion” (these are usually kept in the ancient Greek as ēthos, pathos, and logos). When all you have is Aristotle, the available means of explanation look nearly unvaryingly tripartite.

What critical poses might rhetoricians two decades into the twenty-first century adopt toward the handful of overused ancient Greek terms and the expectation that all rhetoricians know and use them? I schematize four attitudes toward recurrent ancient rhetorical terms: affirmation, opposition, augmentation, and inversion. For each stance, I specify a few of its attractive and unattractive qualities. For the sake of cohesion, I pull examples pertaining to pistis (Aristotle’s term for what’s created between a speaker and the audience when the speaker uses logos, pathos, or ēthos) through the four-fold schema.

AFFIRMATION

One option is to affirm our commitment to the small set of ancient rhetorical terms already enumerated. That affirmation cannot be sentimental or defensive, however. It has to be radical; that is, undertaken with a suspicious regard for roots. Any given ancient Greek rhetorical term points far backward by virtue of its antiquity, but that mark should not be fixed as the only one that matters. In contrast to a fixation on origins, attendance to movement across time, space, and tongues puts emphasis on crossings. For that reason, translation presents itself as a foremost concern of this stance. First, I’ll consider translation as a taking across of terms from one time and place to another and then in its conventional sense of a taking across from one language to another.

During the so-called “globalizing of rhetoric” debates of the 1990s, Carolyn Miller argued for the value of a capacious understanding of translation precisely because translation so often acts “as a metaphor for transhistorical appropriation and interpretation” in debates about the scope of rhetoric’s applicability. If the bounds of rhetoric are circumscribed by the terms—as
in both scope and concepts—of its ancient Greek theorization, construed as faithfully as possible to their original conditions, then to call them narrow seems like lush overstatement. One problem with drawing boundaries that way, of course, is that it ignores successive receptions of ancient rhetorical concepts and all the meanings and meaning that have accrued to them accordingly.

In her summary of prevalent approaches toward translation in the mid-1990s, Miller cites the translational distinction Richard Rorty makes between “contemporary appropriation” and “historical reconstruction,” the first referring to efforts to pull the past into the present for dialogue and exchange, and the second describing efforts to understand past events on their own terms with as little anachronism as possible. Rorty’s distinction—it is important to emphasize that he did not see it as an opposition—was zealously adopted by Edward Schiappa. The debates in the early 1990s between Schiappa and John Poulakos largely amount to a disagreement over the historiographical limits of theorizing with or even about ancient Greek concepts, including ῥῆτορική (rhetoric) itself. That Henry Johnstone felt he could adjudicate their debate in part by pointing out that neither of them accented “techne” in their transliterations is darkly funny: distinguishing an eta from an epsilon seems like the least of our worries when it comes to figuring out what to do with rhetoric’s ancient terms and their eternal return. Miller speaks to all the layers at play when she describes ancient rhetorical terms as “a conceptual vocabulary for interpretation which has itself been created by the process of interpretation. The rhetorical vocabulary has been appropriated and transformed from a tradition that is continually being appropriated and transformed.” The affirmative stance amounts to an acknowledgment of that accretion and of further acts of appropriation, transformation, and interpretation through translation that are to come.

Of course, translation also pertains to the matter of how to render ancient Greek and Latin technical terms into English. I mean by this kind of “translation” an interpretive process informed by the ingenuity-inspiring impossibility of achieving a one-to-one correspondence between one language and another. This impossibility does not put us at a loss, as in the Frost/Coppola commonplace “lost in translation”; moreover, with ancient languages in particular, the loss premise risks a dangerous fetishizing of pure, precious origins. One of the main objectives of translator Karen
Emmerich is to dispense with “the assumption that translation attempts a transfer of some semantic invariant” and to encourage a view of translation as “interpretive iteration.” Translating is not an exercise in copying (which would always be doomed to fail) but in copiousness: translators literally have to use words different from those they are translating, and thus cannot ever say the same thing as the text they are translating. And translations need to change with the times.

In her 1990 book *The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric*, Kathleen Welch highlights the use of outmoded translations as one source of dissatisfaction with what she calls classical keywords. “The keyword problem is made worse by the predominance of many English translations—particularly of Aristotle and Cicero—that are so old that they do not speak to many users of contemporary English,” she writes. In particular, “important Greek keywords such as pistis, ethos, and arete shrivel for many late-twentieth-century readers, when translators present them as, respectively, ‘proof,’ ‘ethical proof,’ and ‘virtue.’” New translations need to be undertaken periodically, and not because an English translation, for example, can help us get closer to what Aristotle meant then but because it can help us get closer to what we mean now than can an English translation undertaken decades ago.

Herein lies a constraint: translating ancient Greek or Latin texts afresh ourselves is an option viable only for rhetoricians who can set about doing intensive and extensive work in ancient Greek and Latin. Given increasing time-to-degree pressures, ancient rhetoric never having been a wildly in-demand specialty on the job market (even in those bygone years when there was a decent job market), and translations not counting toward tenure and promotion, that is work not many will have the privilege to dare to undertake.

The good news, however, is that we can locate and use updated translations, comparing translations diachronically to track shifts and sedimentations in how keywords are rendered, or even read a single ancient rhetoric text with priorities in mind that do not align with its translators and commentators (of whatever time period). Take *pistis*, for example, which Welch counted among the classical keywords whose common translation, in this case “proof,” confines the word to a narrow sense of the evidentiary. Though James Kinneavy and C. Jan Swearingen wrote about *pistis* as “faith” and “belief” in the 1990s, their work was not adopted widely enough
to shift the hegemony of “proof.” Furthermore, engaging with its role in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Danielle Allen renders *pistis* not as “proof” or “mode of persuasion” but as a means of “trust-production.” What could rhetorical pedagogy, criticism, and theory look like if “faith” or “trust” rather than “proof” were one of its central terms?

The driving force behind affirmation as I articulate it here is a commitment to understanding common ancient rhetorical terms through fresh attitudes toward translation, variously conceived, which could generate new lines of research, unsettling the founding and foundational assumptions of Rhetorical Studies by means of the very material they are made of.

**OPPOSITION**

Outright opposition to predominant ancient Greek concepts is another solid stance, and it underlies several of the most consequential intercessions characterizing contemporary rhetorical theory. These interventions have converged on terms critics deem central to ancient rhetoric—such as “persuasion,” “civility,” and “citizenship”—and harmful to ethical interpersonal communication and to communal and coalitional efforts toward equity, diversity, access, and inclusion, both among our objects of study and within the ranks of Rhetorical Studies itself.

For example, in “On White-Speak and Gatekeeping: Or, What Good Are the Greeks?,” their contribution to a 2018 Race and Rhetoric forum in *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, Martin Law and Lisa M. Corrigan identify a correlation between the grip ancient Greek concepts have on Rhetorical Studies and the whiteness of the discipline. The very few ancient rhetorical terms that have become focal points of contemporary rhetorical training and scholarship can—and sometimes do—block new ways of doing scholarship, new foci of scholarship, and new scholars from historically and currently underrepresented groups. Law and Corrigan vow that

our concerns are shaped by the deployment of the Greeks in ways that we feel displace more contemporary theoretical literatures that describe phenomena that the Greeks were unconcerned with and silent about. To take one example, Aristotelian rhetorical theory focuses on locating the “appropriate” (*to prepon*) means of
persuasion as determined by explicit rules and implicit conventions. It offers no recourse for rhetors (those that Blair calls “disturbers”) whose ideas, voices, or bodies are considered inherently inappropriate (whether by rule or convention). This limitation makes the Greek canon ill-suited to account meaningfully for the disruptive tactics of contemporary antiracists and antifascists, for example. How can decorum-obsessed critical frameworks dominated by endless debates about the politics of [nonwhite] civility make sense of the radical rhetorics of, say, black liberal activists (or other radical leftists) who reject tactics like persuasion, identification, and political engagement?32

The solution they propose is to “think beyond inclusion and instead actively exclude those vocabularies that reinforce marginalization of nonwhite scholars. Failure to do so leaves us with a version of ‘inclusion’ that is limited to criticism about race rather than texts for the liberation of nonwhite writers and readers.”33 It is notable that Law and Corrigan stress, in particular, the harmful effects of a disciplinary focus on “‘appropriate’ means of persuasion,” since that framing puts us back in the realm of ēthos, pathos, and logos. Surely one great irony of Rhetorical Studies is that, in 1970, Edward P. J. Corbett, the very scholar credited with pulling ancient rhetoric into Composition Studies in the 1960s, pointed to the need to theorize tactics of ēthos being deployed “in much of the rhetoric of confrontation,” “including shocking or infuriating or alienating an audience with obscenities, threats, aspersions,” which he also calls “‘telling it like it is’” and “forthrightness.”34 He offers that, since it has met with a measure of success, “maybe the strategy of abrasiveness is a new ‘available means of persuasion.’”35 Despite Corbett’s encouragements and hundreds of other inducements, ēthos has not been stretched significantly beyond its Aristotelian form. Further, though pathos is an Aristotelian means of persuasion, too many rhetoricians think, in contradiction to the evidence, that Aristotle has little time for it, the unstated premise being that his inattention sanctions ours. Corrigan opens the Acknowledgments portion of her most recent monograph, Black Feelings: Race and Affect in the Long Sixties, with anecdotes from her peer-review experiences at disciplinary journals, whose reviewers consistently and “lazily rejected any rhetorical analyses that took seriously the political theory of practical activism of radical black movement organizations.
I was tired of hearing that radical black leaders were ‘too emotional’ and weren’t pragmatic enough.” Corrigan uses the word “pathos” only once in her book, and Aristotle is nowhere near. She does not need him, and his exclusion ought not to be problematic.

A serious constraint, however, of the opposition stance as Law and Corrigan assume it, especially in the title of their piece, is that it dangerously distorts “the Greeks” when it cedes them to whiteness. Backdating the recent cultural construction of whiteness so dramatically that it applies to ancient cultures is the very move white supremacists make when they claim ancient Athens or ancient Rome as origin points of whiteness. That is why Nell Irvin Painter begins her history of white people with chapters on ancient Greeks and Romans. She writes, “Not a few Westerners have attempted to racialize antiquity, making ancient history into white race history and classics into a lily-white field complete with pictures of blond ancient Greeks. Transforming the ancients into Anglo-Saxon ancestors made classics unwelcoming to African American classicists.” Can we acknowledge that ancient Athens and ancient Rome have been mobilized symbolically by generations of overt or implicit racists without regarding ancient Athens and Rome as white cityscapes? As classicist Rebecca Futo Kennedy insists, “The Classical texts and peoples themselves are not inherently ‘Western’ or ‘white,’ but there is a reason some people think so and we need to do better at teaching Classical antiquity in all its diversity and showing that we understand and own its racist uses—past and present.” The solution to the ugly side of ancient Greece and Rome and what people in subsequent periods—and that includes scholars—have carried out of them and amplified is not to exclude it but to teach it honestly and critically. At least, that’s the solution for a classicist, who, after all, must teach about antiquity in some capacity. Rhetoricians need to ask themselves if they are under the same obligation. If we are, then we need to teach and use ancient rhetorical concepts radically differently. And this charge extends to peer review.

Ancient rhetorical concepts should not be used by gatekeepers to deem antiracist, anticapitalist, and antifascist rhetorical action insufficiently rhetorical. And, yet, so long as only a few ancient rhetorical terms—and unfavorably translated ones, at that—are held up again and again, regardless of suitability, as standards of rhetorical action, then such terms will be an impediment to fair peer review. The gatekeepers Law and Corrigan rightfully decry are making systems of ancient rhetoric small in addition to their
other, more significant abuses. If mashing up a contemporary example with an overexposed ancient rhetorical term is a requirement of publication, then both the terms and disciplinary journals will be worse off. One result of a thoughtless insistence on the use of such terms is that the terms lose all dynamism. Welch points out that “appropriators of keywords who remain completely unaware of their escalating or de-escalating meanings over the seven hundred years of classical rhetoric and the similar fluctuations among postclassical readers, tend to base their single-level translations (their translations-as-substitutions) on the idea of classical rhetoric as a monolith.”

The term ἔθος is a good example. It looks very different in Aristotle than it does centuries later in Quintilian, the latter of whom categorizes it as a weak form of pathos. What could rhetorical pedagogy, criticism, and theory look like if we understood ἔθος to be a faint, loose, or sly emotional connection?

Reevaluations of ancient rhetorical terms, such as the kind offered in the previous stance and to be offered in the two subsequent stances, may go some way in making irrelevant or unnecessarily narrow applications of ancient rhetorical terms less likely, which may reduce the frequency of their being used to gatekeep. The next two stances presume there are ways to displace familiar ancient rhetorical terms without dispensing with them entirely; in particular, they ask whether the existence of other, less explored ancient terms makes an unquestioned, uncritical insistence on the same ancient terms by gatekeepers of the discipline much less acceptable.

**AUGMENTATION**

Another possibility is to inhabit what we have inherited from twentieth-century discipline building but to push the walls out, adding to the familiar terms by identifying within ancient sources their less well-known complements, counterparts, and even contraries. Augmentation cannot go on *ad infinitum*, since it is checked by the finite languages and cultures of the ancient world, but it can push far beyond the current conceptual contours. Some of the underexplored ancient Greek and Latin terms that have appeared in recent years include: *metanoia* (what occurs when a Kairos is not grasped), *occultatio* (the opposite of clarity), *alloiostrophos* (which off-sets metaphor), *accumulatio* (a relation of copia), and *epicrisis* (amplification through allusion or citation).
Admittedly, this growth model does not always include critical attention to the entailments of continuing to let ancient terms—and nearly always ancient Greek and Latin ones—occupy the foundation level of theory building in the discipline. The volume *Ancient Rhetorics and Digital Networks* takes on the matter, however, and largely out of the necessity of explaining why the titular combination seems incongruous if not ridiculous but is neither. We (Damien Smith Pfister and myself) justify our use of ancient rhetorics—Greek, Roman, Confucian, Buddhist, and Jainist—to study digitally networked communication a few ways, but here is one: “Historically, major media transitions and ancient rhetorical theory enjoy an iterative relation, linking and looping together at key junctures,” such as the coincidence of print technology with the rediscovery of full works by ancient rhetoricians (e.g., Quintilian) in the early modern period and the frequent naming of digital programs after features or figures prominent in the rhetorical tradition.\(^4\) Understood according to the schema I have been presenting here, *Ancient Rhetorics and Digital Networks* is an act of translation, but it also extends the inventory of rhetoric’s ancient terms.

My pledge to use *pistis*-based examples, joined with the popularity of this chapter among readers of *Ancient Rhetorics and Digital Networks*, brings us to the chapter cowritten by Rosa Eberly and Jeremy David Johnson. In “Isocratean *Tropos* and Mediated Multiplicity,” they explore Isocratean *tropos* (turn, “suggesting turning and mutability”) as an alternative to Aristotelian *ēthos* (character, “suggesting dwelling and consistency”).\(^5\) As the authors put it, “The theoretical and practical chasms between Aristotelian *ēthos* and Isocratean *tropos* span a profound duplicity at the ancient heart of conceptions of self: Are we one? Are we many? Beyond theoretical conceptions of identity, how does actually existing identity-in-time—longitude—complicate even further how we make sense of ourselves and how others make sense of us? How can we trace the spaces between the turning places of multi-ply mediated identity?”\(^6\) That digitality presses upon identity in distinctive ways gives exigency to philology.

A perhaps unintended attribute of the opposition stance as framed above is that it calls to mind the discipline’s focus on the cultural productions associated with ancient Athens and Rome at the expense of an immense ancient world. Comparative ancient rhetorics, as represented by work done by Margaret Zulick on the ancient Hebrew vocabulary of persuasion, Xing Lu on ancient Chinese rhetoric in comparison to classical
Greek rhetoric, and Scott Church on ancient Buddhist concepts related to *imitatio* and *conformatio*, showcases instances of cultural congruity that enlarge upon the usual vocabulary. There is also work that explicitly avoids comparison with ancient Greek rhetoric, such as that of Maulana Karenga on ancient African communicative practice, in which he uses “classical African sources, principally ancient Egyptian (Kemetic) texts, as a fundamental point of departure and framework for understanding and engaging African American rhetoric.” Arabella Lyon uses the thoroughly Confucian concepts *jiàn* (remonstration), *shù* (the recognition of oneself in others), and *zhōng* (acts of duty to others) to understand the 2014 Hong Kong protests known as the Umbrella Movement. To position the terms of ancient Athenian and Roman rhetorical culture as the markers of rhetorical practice for which a scholar must find analogues is to limit our understanding of ancient rhetorical cultures and to constrict contemporary historiography, pedagogy, criticism, and theorizing.

Even with all this building going on, or because of it, maybe, the small subset of ancient Greek rhetorical concepts still largely sets the terms of rhetorical history, pedagogy, theory, and criticism. The reluctance to part from them seems to come largely from contentment that their significance is not up for debate and we all know what they mean. As I have shown, that’s certainly one feeling, but it is not the only feeling.

**Inversion**

In several senses, this volume aims to change the terms of rhetorical theory. It uses a grammatical construction known as the alpha privative to alter the theoretical potential of some familiar ancient Greek rhetorical terms—namely, *technē, topos, kairos, doxa, gnōsis, pathos,* and *phantasia*—by turning them against themselves, but the contestation is not an outright opposition. To invert these terms is to engage in translation and augmentation informed by the opposition position, and the alpha privative performs those operations in a peculiar way.

The typical understanding of the alpha privative emphasizes how its construction (i.e., the alpha privative plus a noun or adjective stem) undercuts its stem, yielding words such as *apathy* (without emotion) and *agnostic* (without knowledge). Yet, an alpha privative overturns its stem in an unusual way. As Page duBois explains:
More than other kinds of contraries, the alpha privative words preserve the presence of the contrary; it is as if instead of hate, we called the contrary of love unlove. The Greeks thus construct such concepts as a-letheia (unhiddeness) for truth, a-topia (placelessness) for eccentricity, a-ponia (nonexertion) for laziness, a-polis (a citizen) for an outlaw. The kind of semantic formulations that occur in positive terms in English, or that have a variety of forms of negation, are in Greek endlessly and alliteratively rendered with this privation, this alpha that both preserves and takes away the sense of the word’s meaning.

A given alpha privative both underlines and undermines the concept at its base, making alpha privatives different from negation (signaled in Greek with the particle *ouk*) and antonymity. Ancient rhetoricians themselves do not say much about the effect of alpha privatives, but Aristotle (yes, him again) uses two alpha-privative examples in his *Rhetoric* when recognizing that “to speak from what is not had” packs amplificatory power. Given the simplicity of its application, the alpha privative can be used to emphasize both “good and bad things that are not possessed, whichever of the two is useful.” Aristotle places this strategic use of alpha privatives into a stylistic category called *ongkos*, meaning capaciousness or expansiveness. That an alpha privative takes up room in such a concentrated, suggestive form explains its appeal to Aristotle, who knows how influential condensed implications tend to be. When truly noticed, an alpha privative prompts questions, such as: How can one account for the lack or the loss of what is missing? Was it ever there? What makes us assume it was, and are those assumptions just? An alpha privative pulls one into the culture of its use by backlighting normative assumptions and experiences, which are, by definition, not what everyone assumes and experiences.

A generative example of the theoretical power of understanding what the alpha privative does comes early in Debra Hawhee’s book on animals and sensation in premodern rhetoric. Chapter 1 of *Rhetoric in Tooth and Claw* opens with a chapter on *alogos* (without *logos*), the adjective Aristotle notoriously uses to describe nonhuman animals in his *Politics*. The word is typically interpreted as a slight, but “the trick is to approach *alogos* as something other than the absence of *logos*, to identify in positive terms what takes the place of *logos*.” Accordingly, what Hawhee finds through
her reading of Aristotle is that “an insistence on nonhuman animals being \textit{aloga} is much an \textit{attribution} as it is a denial or rejection, and this attribution of expansive, and oftentimes intense feeling to nonhuman animals helps account for their constitutive role in the teaching and shaping of rhetorical theory.”\textsuperscript{57} Hawhee centers \textit{alos} to see sensation better, not to make a case against reason.

The alpha privative has poignant implications for Rhetorical Studies, since its use allows one simultaneously to point to and away from persistent ancient terms. Such terms have been an undeniable part of the discipline, but that does not mean they need to continue to be in their usual forms. The alpha-privative guises of familiar concepts—\textit{atechnē}, \textit{atopos}, \textit{akairos}, \textit{adoxa}, \textit{apatheia}, \textit{aphantasia}—appear in ancient works, but not always in rhetorical handbooks, meaning their implications for rhetoric have been undertheorized or not theorized at all. We also avail of the alpha privative to make a case for the inclusion of some terms not often used in Rhetorical Studies in their nonprivative form (e.g., \textit{a/nostos}, \textit{a/poria}, \textit{a/gnōstos}). There is also one instance of a Latinate alpha privative not used at all in ancient Roman texts: \textit{asignification}.

Inversions of well-known ancient rhetorical concepts yield perspectives on relational and communal life that are often ignored by the terms in their familiar forms. As Mari Lee Mifsud has argued, the alpha privative does not so much deprive as “free and invent something new.”\textsuperscript{59} Alpha privatives offer contrariness without outright opposition, which mirrors the critical intervention of this volume: we are unsettling familiar ancient Greek rhetorical terms but not unseating ancient Greek terms altogether. By presenting old terms in new forms, we hope to go some way in redressing critiques about their limits, mainly regarding their on-going relevance, explanatory power, or exclusionary effects.

\textbf{Arrangement of This Volume}

\textit{Inverting Rhetoric} bears similarities to the not uncommon keyword approach made famous by Raymond Williams in his 1976 book, \textit{Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society}. For Williams, the concept of keywords has “two connected senses: they are significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation; they are significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought.”\textsuperscript{60} Most collections employing the
keyword-based structure itemize one-word concepts that have undisputed if perhaps underappreciated importance in culture or a particular culture. In Rhetorical Studies, the 2018 special issue of *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Rhetoric Society of America, offers a good example. Entitled “Keywords: A Glossary of the Pasts and Futures of the Rhetoric Society of America” and edited by Michelle Ballif, the issue forwards nine keywords—the body, the digital, energy, genre, *kairos*, memory, public, resistance, and sound—that emerged from a call that invited rhetoricians to submit one-hundred-word pitches. The special issue provided a space for representatives of Rhetorical Studies to reflect on its past and project its potential futures, as seen through a given (well, chosen) disciplinary keyword. Keyword-based projects are usually preservative; that is, they are meant to articulate a relatively stable, orienting vocabulary. Ballif points out, however, that “although a collection of such words with ostensibly shared meanings serves to bind a community, those very keywords” can “render disciplinary homes unhomely.” There is nothing quite like feeling your discipline’s keywords do not speak to you or are used to keep you out.

By inverting some of the most well-known, frequently taught theoretical concepts in Rhetorical Studies (including one from the *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* special issue), the contributors to this present volume offer what we hope is productive disorientation. Each chapter runs at approximately five thousand words, and that compactness makes for entries that are necessarily enthymematic and dynamic. Because, though, each contributor introduces a little-known term and explains how it differs from its more familiar form, even readers who are new to Rhetorical Studies will be able to keep up.

The first two chapters, grouped together under the heading of “Escape Velocity,” demonstrate an evasion of the usual forces at work when theorizing is undertaken with ancient rhetorical terms. Mari Lee Mifsud takes on *atechnē*, meaning “without *technē*,” specifically the *technē* of rhetoric, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* being the most famous place the distinction between *entechnē* and *atechnē* is drawn. By vexing the common translation of *technē* to “art” and arguing for “system” instead, Mifsud initiates a reframing of *atechnē* as that which is without, against, or in excess of systems, and pursues how we might use that reframing to understand equity and justice. In his chapter on asignification, John Muckelbauer seeks to divest the linguistic turn, with all
its vibrating energy about signification, of any of its remaining inertia. What if rhetoric offers the possibility of attending to a dimension of language that is irreducible to the entire apparatus of signification? Because both Mifsud and Muckelbauer work on (and largely against) systems-thinking, their chapters break with the order of things considerably.

The second section, “(Out of) Place,” takes on questions of belonging, fit, and fittingness. It unites chapters on atopus (without a place), anostos (without a homecoming), and akairos (without opportunity). Atopus, at the center of my chapter, literally means “without a place” or “out of place” but is more commonly translated as “strange,” “odd,” or even “unnatural.” I organize and theorize “out of place” attributions into three types—the atopus of transgression, the atopus of exception, and the atopus of juxtaposition—to demonstrate variants of their rhetorical force. For im/migrants, émigrés, exiles, refugees, and asylees, “home” has a particular poignancy. Anthony J. Irizarry enters that space, writing about anostos, or a place of no return, which marks the limits of homecoming’s rhetorical and democratic potential. This place of no return can manifest as the inability to realize home or work toward home, but it can also be the state of being-at-home, which would render the act of returning or homecoming unnecessary. Closing the section, Bess R. H. Myers uses eulogy to build a theory of the akairic, a fitting pairing since death is rarely perceived as falling at the right time and place in the lifespan of the deceased or the bereaved. Myers also considers whether akairos may be a better term to think with than kairos, since its paradoxical nature encourages experimentation with the inappropriate, the improper, and the unfitting.

The next section, “(Not) Knowing for Sure,” attends to how and when what seem to be settled certainties are troubled. It holds chapters on adoxa (a state of being without the usual opinion), aporia (a state of being without a passageway), and agnostic (being without knowledge). Caddie Alford turns all the talk about the centrality of doxa to rhetorical life on its head and argues that it is actually adoxa, or “generally rejected” positions, that most motivate rhetorical theory, activism, and criticism. Also working with (un) conventions of disruption, Damien Smith Pfister plays with the meaning of poros as “pathway” to reclaim aporia from its dominant affective meaning of a frustrating impasse. In a time when all manner of companies are trying to track where we look, to refuse to offer up one’s visual pathway for scrutiny is to refuse corporate commodification and control. “Aporia of the
gaze,” a concept of Pfister’s coining, champions the wandering eye and its contributions to the sort of (relatively) unchanneled looking that is fundamental to serendipity, encounter, and democratic interaction. Keeping in the realm of the digital, Cory Geraths uses “Striking Vipers,” a 2019 episode of the series Black Mirror, to theorize modes of being agnostic; in particular, he introduces the idea of agnōstos erōs, or desirous love that resists the usual maneuvers of a knower, such as classification, interpretation, and domination.

The final section, “(Not) Seeing It That Way,” attunes to the spectrums and limits of perceptive-affective intensities, featuring chapters on apathy (without emotion) and aphantasia (without imagination). First, Nathaniel A. Rivers gives the usual line about apathy these days: it marks a lack of energy, engagement, and a shared sense of exigence. Then, using the 1983 film WarGames, he shows how apathy might be more generatively theorized as a redirection of destructively intense emotional engagement; not entirely, as with Stoic apatheia, but with certain pathē, in certain situations. In his chapter on aphantasia, Benjamin Firgens puts received rhetorical traditions and modern psychology into conversation to think through not only the practical and ethical implications of the unimagined but also the normative assumptions about visualizing capacities made in much of the literature about imagination.

The volume concludes with a short appendix of alpha-privative terms we did not explore here, replete with definitions, bibliographic pointers, and brief invitations for further use. Overall, contributors boast expertise in the following areas: ancient rhetoric, ancient and contemporary Christianity, gender and sexuality studies, im/migration studies, media studies, networked rhetorics, posthumanism, public address, public memory, science and technology studies, and visual rhetoric. As a result, each chapter both holds rhetoric at its hub and spokes toward other subject matters. The volume has, we think, an inviting miscellaneous quality as well as being unified by its insistence that alpha-privative concepts can make much-needed theoretical headway in Rhetorical Studies. Fundamentally, this volume demonstrates that we rhetoricians do not need to limit ourselves to the “same old, same old” old terms; hopefully, it also communicates that use of their inverted forms is not a non-negotiable term of entry into Rhetorical Studies, either.
NOTES


6. Carly S. Woods and I curated evidence of this early orientation toward Greek antiquity in the names and accompanying images of disciplinary societies and journals; see “Moving Rhetorica,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 48, no. 1 (January 2018): 3–27. Ira Allen has argued that “a fantastical continuity between the ‘classical’ and the ‘modern’ is key to, in some sense constitutive of, the spirit of rhetorical theory,” and he explores the nature of that fantasy. See Ira J. Allen, The Ethical Fantasy of Rhetorical Theory (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018), 37.


10. Isocrates, Against the Sophists 13.


15. Ibid., 215.


18. Carolyn Miller speculates on what the past and present of genre theory in rhetoric might have looked like had Aristotle treated speech as variably as he treats biological life. See Carolyn R. Miller, “Genre in Ancient and Networked Media,” in Ancient Rhetorics and Digital Networks, ed. Michele Kennerly and Damien Smith Pfister (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2018), 176–204.


22. These debates are easy to find.


26. Welch, Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric, 12.

27. Ibid., 17. Since I will touch upon pistis and ēthos throughout, here I cite a piece on aretē that complicates its translation as “virtue”: Debra Hawhee, ‘Agonism and Aretē,”


30. Jarron Slater is working on a project about renderings of *pistis* across twentieth- and twenty-first-century English translations of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, and Scott Koslow is doing comparative work on English translations of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric. Both papers are, at this moment, unpublished.


37. Ibid., 116.


46. Ibid., 133.


privative and its communicative power. For an
analysis of the alpha privatives in Aeschylus's
trilogy, see Naomi Finkelstein, "Unmention-
ables: The Erinyes as the Culmination of Alpha
Privative and Negated Language in Aeschylus's
Oresteia," unpublished dissertation (Columbia
University, 2010).

52. The alpha privatives he uses are τὸ
ἄχορδον and τὸ ἄλυρον, which an unnamed
poet used to describe a musical strain "without
chords" and "without a lyre" (1408a6–7).
From these details, we are meant to conclude
a flute was used, and a flute connotes wildness
(!). From Aristotlelis, Ars Rhetorica, ed. W. D.
Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959),
1408a1. Hereafter, I cite this source as Aristotle,
Rhetoric.

53. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1408a4–6. Translation
mine.


55. See, e.g., his treatment of gnōmai
and enthymemes in his Rhetoric.


57. Ibid., 14 (italics original).

58. Though significatio is a Latin word,
which first appears as a rhetorical term in the
Rhetorica ad Herennium, in fact, asignificatio is
not ([Cicero,] Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.67,
University Press, 1954]).

59. Mari Lee Mifsud, Rhetoric and the Gift:
Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Contemporary
Communication (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 2015), 146–47.

60. Raymond Williams, introduction to his
Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society,
rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985), 11–26, at 15.

61. See, e.g., Benjamin Peters, ed., Digital
Keywords: A Vocabulary of Information Society
and Culture (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2016).

62. Michelle Ballif, "Introduction: Key-
words; A Prelude and an Appendix," Rhetoric
Ballif, Susan Jarrett (Rhetoric Society Quarterly
editor at the time), and two members of the
editorial board evaluated the approximately
sixty proposals they received (232).

63. Ballif, "Keywords," 232.

64. Thanks to Damien Smith Pfister for his
encouragements and suggestions during the
initial composition of this introduction.