The
first book written exclusively on the argument from ignorance as
a distinctive type of argument.
Arguments
from Ignorance explores the situations in which the argument
from ignorance (also known as the lack-of-knowledge inference, negative
evidence, or default reasoning) functions as a respectable form
of reasoning and those in which it is indeed fallacious. Douglas
Walton draws on everyday conversations on all kinds of practical
matters in which the argumentum ad ignorantiam is used quite
appropriately to infer conclusions. He also discusses the inappropriate
use of this kind of argument, referring to various major case studies,
including the Salem witchcraft trials, the McCarthy hearings, and
the Alger Hiss case. This
book makes an original contribution in the areas of argumentation
theory and informal logic, contending that, despite its traditional
classification as a fallacy, the argument from ignorance is a genuine,
very common, and legitimate type of argumentation with an identifiable
structure. But the book is also interdisciplinary in scope, explaining
many widely interesting and controversial subjects in artificial
intelligence, medical education, philosophy of science, and philosophy
of law in a clear way that makes it accessible to a broad range
of readers.
|
|
|
| Douglas
Walton is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Winnipeg.
He is the author of many books, including The Place of Emotion
in Argument (Penn State, 1992), Plausible Argument in Everyday
Conversation (SUNY, 1992), and Slippery Slope Arguments (Oxford, 1992). |
|
|