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Keeping
Tito Afloat The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War,
1945-1960
Lorraine M. Lees
1997
History - American, Comparative Politics
Hardback: $53.00 SH
ISBN: 978-0-271-01629-0
Paperback: $23.95 SH
ISBN: 978-0-271-02650-3
"Keeping Tito Afloat offers the most comprehensive treatment
of U.S.-Yugoslav relations during the Cold War. Lees has an excellent
feel for the development of policy within the American government,
and she provides insightful analysis of the motives and actions
of key people in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. But
the book is not simply focused on the U.S.; it offers valuable insight
into Tito and his ability to resist American 'plans' for him."-Wilson
D. Miscamble, University of Notre Dame
"This account is the best single source on United States-Yugoslav
relations during the Truman and Eisenhower years."-Journal of
American History
Keeping Tito Afloat draws upon newly declassified documents
to show the critical role that Yugoslavia played in U.S. foreign
policy with the communist world in the early years of the Cold War.
After World War II, the United States considered Yugoslavia to be
a loyal Soviet satellite, but Tito surprised the West in 1948 by
breaking with Stalin. Seizing this opportunity, the Truman administration
sought to "keep Tito afloat" by giving him military and economic
aid. President Truman hoped that American involvement would encourage
other satellites to follow Tito's example and further damage Soviet
power. However, Lees demonstrates that it was President Eisenhower
and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who most actively tried
to use Tito as a "wedge" to liberate the Eastern Europeans.
By the end of 1958, Eisenhower and Dulles discontinued this "wedge
strategy" because it raised too many questions about the ties that
should exist between communist, non-communist, and neutral states.
As Tito shrewdly kept the U.S. at arm's length, Eisenhower was forced
to accept Tito's continued absence from the Soviet orbit as victory
enough. In the period between 1958 and 1960, Lees examines U.S.
political objectives that remained after military support for Tito
was discontinued. Although use of Yugoslavia as a wedge never fully
succeeded, Lees shows how that strategy reflected the pragmatic
and geopolitical policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Keeping Tito Afloat utilizes diverse sources including
personal interviews with key U.S. and Yugoslav officials, official
and private papers and oral histories from the Roosevelt, Truman,
and Eisenhower libraries, State Department records, some only recently
declassified, from the National Archives, and the papers of George
F. Kennan and John Foster Dulles.
Lorraine
M. Lees is Associate Professor of History at Old Dominion
University. She is co-editor of volumes 26 and 27 of Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1955-57.