Conscience,
once a core concept for ethics, has mostly disappeared from modern
moral theory. In this book Douglas Langston traces its intellectual
history to account for its neglect while arguing for its still vital
importance, if correctly understood.
In medieval times, Langston shows in Part I, the notions of conscientia
and synderesis from which our contemporary concept of conscience
derives were closely connected to Greek ideas about the virtues
and practical reason, although in Christianized form. As modified
by Luther, Butler, and Kant, however, conscience later came to be
regarded as a faculty like will and intellect, and when faculty
psychology fell into disrepute, so did the role of conscience in
moral philosophy.
A view of mature conscience that sees it as relational, with cognitive,
emotional, and conative dimensions, can survive the criticisms of
conscience as faculty, and in Part II through discussions of Freud,
Ryle, and other modern thinkers Langston proceeds to reconstruct
conscience as a viable philosophical concept.
Finally, in Part III, this better grounded concept is connected
with the modern revival of virtue ethics, and Langston shows how
crucial conscience is to a theory of virtue because it is fundamental
to the training of any morally good person.
