"By focusing on the relationship between the executive branch
and the ruling political party, Corrales provides an interesting
and ambitious explanation for the recent institutional demise of
the two nations. While the details of this relationship differ for
Argentina and Venezuela, the overall thesis which Corrales advances
is very appealing. . . . Corrales's views do justice to Latin America's
complexity;Ża complexity which, sadly, is frequently misinterpreted
or ignored. . . ."—Leo Zaibert, Times Literary Supplement
"In Presidents Without Parties, Javier Corrales makes a significant
contribution to the growing literature on the comparative political
economy of state and market reform. . . . By weaving together arguments
from the political science literature on parties and executives
with analytical perspectives drawn from rational choice and public
choice approaches, this book is 'controversial' in the best sense
by challenging much of the conventional wisdom and scholarship on
the politics of economic reform." —William C. Smith, University
of Miami
Most studies about the politics of economic reform focus on the
struggles between the state and interest groups or opposition political
parties. In this book Javier Corrales argues instead that the key
struggle is between the executive and the ruling party. Deep economic
transformations require cooperation from the ruling party. This
support allows the state to sustain societal support and simultaneously
ward off the potentially paralyzing influence of interest groups.
Without such cooperation, the executive loses credibility and the
political fortitude necessary to neutralize the opposition from
skeptical as well as cost-bearing sectors of society.
Presidents Without Parties puts this argument to the test
by examining closely what happened in Argentina and Venezuela during
the 1990s. Similarly situated when they embarked on economic reform
in 1989, Argentina experienced success, with the reformers reelected
in 1995, whereas Venezuela saw its reformers' efforts fail, leading
to a prolonged crisis. Corrales shows precisely how the executive's
relationship with the ruling party shaped the different outcomes
in the two countries. He then applies this argument to eight other
cases of market reform in Latin American countries in the 1990s.
This book resuscitates and refines the ancient but often forgotten
argument that political parties are indispensable for governability.
In an era in which it is trendy to discount the usefulness of parties
and to celebrate extrapartisan institutions, Corrales offers a reconsideration
of the costs of trying to govern in the absence of competitive parties.
